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[This article critically analyses recent law reforms that have taken place throughout Australia 
allowing for the transfer of legal parentage in surrogacy arrangements from the birth mother (and 
her partner, if any) to the ‘intended parents’. Although styled as liberalising reforms, the increas-
ingly complex web of eligibility rules are likely to be an ill fit with the existing and future family 
formation behaviours of those involved in surrogacy, and may ultimately exclude more families than 
they assist. While surrogacy policy throughout Australia aims to prevent the exploitation of women 
who act as birth mothers, to prevent the commercialisation of reproduction and to protect the 
interests of current and future children born through these means, this article argues that the 
reforms are unlikely to meet these aims. The interest of children in having a legal relationship with 
the parents who are raising them will not be met for many, as half of the regimes exclude children 
conceived outside the jurisdiction and all of them exclude arrangements where payment has been 
made to the birth mother. Potential harms are not being prevented, but rather are being exported 
elsewhere through the increasing incidence of international surrogacy. A more flexible and 
inclusive approach to parental transfer, such as that which currently exists in UK law, is recom-
mended.] 
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I   INTRODUCTION  
That is what being infertile means. You have to look at every other option. In-
fertility makes you consider alternative ways to become parents that you would 
never have dreamed of. It makes you realise that giving birth does not define 
you as a parent and becoming a parent is more important than becoming preg-
nant.  
Trea Burger, intended mother.1 
Because we are not our children’s legal guardians we could not enrol them 
when they started school and when they had their tonsils out, their surrogate 
mother had to sign the hospital papers. … While she is a mother of five and 
happy to do this for us, I worry that if anything happened [to us] the children 
would be legally theirs and they already have a family. … It’s been a big strain 
on our family life … We just get our hopes up then they come crashing down 
again. 
Jackie Robinson, mother of 10-year-old twin boys born through surrogacy.2 
I guess in general the approach is that we are not really trying to encourage surro-
gacy. … We are saying, ‘We want to regulate it. We want to control it. We want to 
make sure that if it is done, it is done properly. We do not want to prohibit it com-
pletely, but we want to make sure that it is done in a responsible way[].  
 
Legal officer, WA Department of Health.3 
Recent years have seen a paroxysm of inquiry and reform around surrogacy 
laws in Australia. In the space of just three years, reports were issued by seven 
public inquiries,4 and a specially-created federal–state government working party 
involving all nine Australian jurisdictions issued a discussion paper intended to 
‘harmonise’ state approaches.5 In turn, this rash of interest has generated new 
 
 1 Evidence to Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, Parliament of Queensland, 
Brisbane, 8 July 2008, 54 (Trea Burger). 
 2  Quoted in Liz Brown, ‘Family’s Legal Dilemma’, Lilydale and Yarra Valley Leader (Lilydale, 
Victoria) 4 February 2008, 3. 
 3 Legislative Council Standing Committee on Legislation, Parliament of Western Australia, Report 
on The Surrogacy Bill 2007 (2008) (‘Western Australian Report’) 5 [4.12]. 
 4  Six of these were parliamentary inquiries: Social Development Committee, Parliament of South 
Australia, Inquiry into Gestational Surrogacy (2007) (‘South Australian Report’); ibid; Legisla-
tive Council Select Committee on Surrogacy, Parliament of Tasmania, Report on Surrogacy 
(2008); Investigation into Altruistic Surrogacy Committee, Queensland Parliament, Report 
(2008) (‘Queensland Report’); Legislative Council Standing Committee on Law and Justice, 
Parliament of New South Wales, Legislation on Altruistic Surrogacy in NSW (2009) (‘New 
South Wales Report’); Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parlia-
ment of Australia, Family Law Amendment (De Facto Financial Matters and Other Measures) 
Bill 2008 [Provisions] (2008). Only one was the product of an independent law reform commis-
sion: Victorian Law Reform Commission, Assisted Reproductive Technology and Adoption: 
Final Report (2007) (‘VLRC Report’). 
 5  See Standing Committee of Attorneys-General Joint Working Group, A Proposal for a National 
Model to Harmonise Regulation of Surrogacy (2009) (‘SCAG Paper’). Unlike countries such as 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand, which have unitary governments and centralised regula-
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surrogacy laws in all Australian jurisdictions except the Northern Territory.6 
Broadly speaking these reforms take place in two areas. One is the amendment of 
laws which had previously restricted eligibility for assisted reproductive technol-
ogy (‘ART’), in order to allow the use of in-vitro fertilisation (‘IVF’) for surro-
gacy in limited circumstances. The other major change, which is the focus of this 
article, was the introduction of state-based regimes for the transfer of legal 
parentage to the ‘commissioning’ or ‘intended’ parents.7 
The stated aim of surrogacy laws in Australia has been, and remains, to prevent 
the exploitation of vulnerable adults, to avoid the commercialisation of reproduc-
tion and to protect the best interests of children.8 The values of non-
discrimination and parental autonomy in family formation are less frequently 
articulated in the legislative principles.9 Although consciously styled as beneficial 
reforms liberalising earlier ‘draconian’ approaches to surrogacy, I argue that this 
 
tors of assisted reproductive technologies (‘ART’), in Australia laws on ART, surrogacy and 
parentage are largely in the hands of the states and have varied considerably in recent decades. 
Canada’s federal legislation on ART was recently partially struck down as unconstitutional, but 
the criminalisation of paid surrogacy (s 12) remains: see Reference re Assisted Human Repro-
duction Act [2010] SCC 61. Parentage laws are in the hands of the provinces, such that Canada 
also faces the problem of children born through surrogacy having different parental status na-
tionwide. Some Canadian provinces have listed intended parents in gestational surrogacy as 
legal parents on birth registers following legal challenges: John Seymour and Sonia Magri, 
‘ART, Surrogacy and Legal Parentage: A Comparative Legislative Review’ (Occasional Paper, 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, August 2004) 43. For further comparison of Canadian and 
Australian surrogacy regulation, see generally Ailis L Burpee, ‘Momma Drama: A Study of How 
Canada’s National Regulation of Surrogacy Compares to Australia’s Independent State Regula-
tion of Surrogacy’ (2009) 37 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 305. 
 6  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT), commenced 22 March 2004; Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW), 
commenced 1 March 2011; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld), commenced 1 June 2010; Statutes 
Amendment (Surrogacy) Act 2009 (SA), commenced 26 November 2010, amending Family 
Relationships Act 1975 (SA), Births, Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1996 (SA) and 
Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 1988 (SA); Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 
(Vic), surrogacy provisions (Pt IV) commenced 1 January 2010; Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA), 
commenced 1 March 2009. The Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas) passed the House of Assembly on 14 
April 2011, but on 14 June 2011 the Legislative Council referred the bill to committee, delaying 
the progress of the bill until late 2011. All references in the text of this article are to the govern-
ment Bill as passed by the Assembly, however it is not known at the time of writing whether 
these provisions will ultimately pass into law. The Legislative Council is dominated by inde-
pendent members, several of whom flagged proposed amendments in the course of debate on the 
referral: Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 14 June 2011, 4-31,38-43. 
 7  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) divs 2.4–2.5; Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) pt 3; Surrogacy Act 2010 
(Qld) ch 3 pt 2; Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) pt 2B div 3; Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas) 
pt 4; Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) pt 4; Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) pt 3. Once such a trans-
fer is granted by a state or territory court, the resulting relationship is recognised by the Family 
Law Act 1975 (Cth) through s 60HB. The status of ‘parent’ and ‘child’ in FLA is then imported 
into several other federal Acts which adopt the Family Law Act definition. Note that, while the 
terminology used in the legislation varies, I use ‘intended parents’ and ‘birth mother’ throughout 
this article, both for consistency and because these terms are role-based descriptions which carry 
less connotation of value judgment than terms such as ‘commissioning parents’, ‘substitute 
parents’, ‘arranged parents’ and ‘surrogate mother’. 
 8  See, eg, Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) ss 3, 8; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 5; Assisted Reproduc-
tive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) ss 5(a)–(b), 44. 
 9  But see Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) ss 6(2)(b), (d); Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 
(Vic) s 5(e). The New South Wales Report did articulate a principle of minimal interference, but 
it was neither encapsulated in a recommendation nor carried into the legislation: New South 
Wales Report, above n 4, 67 [4.92]. 
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new era may offer little benefit to children born through surrogacy. This is 
because the increasingly complex web of eligibility rules, developed through 
successive reforms to pre-empt and safeguard the interests of children, appears to 
be an ill fit with the family formation behaviours of those involved in surrogacy. 
There is a major dearth of empirical data on the practice of surrogacy in Aus-
tralia over past decades, with only a few small qualitative studies in existence.10 
Critically, none of the inquiries generating these new laws paused to commission 
research on the actual experience of surrogacy in Australia. This lack of evidence 
was compounded by the fact that, with the exception of Victoria,11 the reform 
inquires were undertaken by hastily convened parliamentary inquiries, where 
only six to nine months was allocated for the entire hearing and reporting 
process. It appears that only one birth mother gave evidence at any inquiry, and 
the inquiries heard from, at most, one or two intended parents who had actually 
gone through surrogacy, and between two and six individuals or couples contem-
plating surrogacy as intended parents.12 Moreover, with the exception of the 
Victorian inquiry, there was no detailed consideration of the available sociologi-
cal research on the experience of birth mothers and intended parents involved in 
surrogacy in comparable countries such as the United Kingdom (‘UK’).13 
 
 10  This limitation was acknowledged in the Queensland Report, above n 4, 2, 11–13. Qualitative 
studies include one unpublished report of interviews with 13 gestational surrogates, referred to 
in the VLRC Report, above n 4, 37, 161, 178. The Victorian Law Reform Commission (‘VLRC’) 
was also alone in addressing the international research: VLRC Report, above n 4, 161–2. 
 11  In contrast to the other states, Victoria’s inquiry was conducted by an established law reform 
commission over several years and entailed extensive consultation as well as the production of 
background papers and discussion papers. While the other inquiries were solely focused on 
surrogacy, Victoria addressed ART regulation broadly, as well as adoption. Victoria nonetheless 
produced a very restrictive model — at least in part because the background context of ART 
regulation in that state has been one of highly prescriptive state control since the 1980s.  
 12  The West Australian inquiry received only three submissions from those directly affected (one 
from a birth mother, one from a couple and one private submission): Western Australian Report, 
above n 3, 19 [4.70]. The Tasmanian inquiry heard from only one intended parent and two 
couples who wished to be: Tasmanian Report, above n 4, 10–11. It is not clear how many of the 
130 written submissions received by the Queensland inquiry were from affected adults, but of 
the 38 people who gave oral evidence there were at least six individuals wishing to be intended 
parents, as well as one woman who wished to be a birth mother but was not actually involved in 
any arrangement: Queensland Report, above n 4, 18–19, 95. The South Australian inquiry heard 
from three couples who had children through gestational surrogacy, one couple who had children 
through genetic surrogacy, one woman whowished to be an intended parent, and two women 
who had been birth mothers: South Australian Report, above n 4, 9. The New South Wales 
inquiry received written submissions from two couples who were already intended parents, and 
two women who wished to be intended parents: see <http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/ 
prod/parlment/committee.nsf/V3ListSubmissions?open&ParentUNID=127CB755FE3D5304CA
25749B0017C3F2>. 
 13  See data from a set of related longitudinal studies in the UK led by Susan Golombok, including: 
Vasanti Jadva et al, ‘Surrogacy: The Experiences of Surrogate Mothers’ (2003) 18 Human Re-
production 2196; Fiona MacCallum et al, ‘Surrogacy: The Experience of Commissioning Cou-
ples’ (2003) 18 Human Reproduction 1334; Susan Golombok et al, ‘Surrogacy Families: Paren-
tal Functioning, Parent–Child Relationships and Children’s Psychological Development at Age 
2’ (2006) 47 Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry 213; S Golombok et al, ‘Non-Genetic 
and Non-Gestational Parenthood: Consequences for Parent–Child Relationships and the Psycho-
logical Well-Being of Mothers, Fathers and Children at Age 3’ (2006) 21 Human Reproduction 
1918. See also numerous studies conducted by Olga van den Akker in the UK, including Olga 
van den Akker, ‘Genetic and Gestational Surrogate Mothers’ Experience of Surrogacy’ (2003) 21 
Journal of Reproductive and Infant Psychology 145; Olga B A van den Akker, ‘A Longitudinal 
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Arguably, the new laws in Australia are based not on evidence of the actual 
behaviours or needs of families formed through surrogacy to date, but rather on 
largely abstract ideas and assumptions about the perils of surrogacy and how it 
can be ‘improved’.14  
In the absence of any broadly-based empirical data on the experience of surro-
gacy in Australia, I undertook, as part of this research, a survey of media reports 
of surrogacy arrangements appearing over the period in which most of the reform 
was occurring. Over the 2007–10 period, the Australian media printed several 
hundred articles about surrogacy, which, when analysed, revealed 69 distinct 
families involved in surrogacy.15 These comprised: 
• 42 ‘past’ arrangements, from which children have been born (with children 
ranging in age from 23 years to one month); 
• 20 ‘current’ arrangements, which included five pregnancies (with the re-
mainder of families either in the process of concluding agreements or trying 
to conceive); and 
• Seven ‘future’ arrangements, where parties were pursuing surrogacy but did 
not have an arrangement in train with a specific birth mother.  
While it is impossible to know if this reportage is in any way representative, it 
is unfortunately the best available data in Australia at this moment. Even as a 
limited media survey of those reporting their experiences publically, this source 
reveals more demographic information on a significantly greater number of 
distinct surrogacy arrangements than all of the reform inquiries put together.16 
While not purporting to be comprehensive, the media survey data is used here to 
identify the experiences of families relating to some of the elements of surrogacy 
that are the focus of the current wave of regulation: in particular, the relationship 
status of intended parents, the relationship of intended parents to birth mother, 
 
Pre-Pregnancy to Post-Delivery Comparison of Genetic and Gestational Surrogate and Intended 
Mothers: Confidence and Genealogy’ (2005) 26 Journal of Psychosomatic Obstetrics and Gy-
necology 277. 
 14  On the role of such assumptions in social science research, see Elly Teman, ‘The Social 
Construction of Surrogacy Research: An Anthropological Critique of the Psychosocial Scholar-
ship on Surrogate Motherhood’ (2008) 67 Social Science and Medicine 1104. 
 15  These reports were all drawn from the Australian media databases FACTIVA and INFORMIT 
using the search words ‘surrogacy’ and ‘surrogate’, covering the period January 2007 to Decem-
ber 2010. Of these reports, 45 indentified at least one person (usually an intended parent, less 
commonly a birth mother) by full name, in 15 there was identification by first names only, and 
in nine all adult parties were unnamed (of those nine reports, either the child’s first name was 
given or the salient facts of each arrangement differed such that it was clear that they were 
distinct arrangements). 
 16  Of the reported arrangements where parties were named, it was possible to identify only eight in 
which individuals or couples gave a submission or testimony to one or more of the reform in-
quiries: those people were Andrew and Michelle Webber, David and Denise Norman, Fiona and 
Robert Rushford, Laura Clark, Kerry and Clive Faggotter, Maggie Kirkman, Stephen Conroy 
and Trea Burger. It is interesting that surrogacy families appear more likely in this period to 
speak to the press than to parliamentary inquiries in the pursuit of law reform. However, as there 
were nine arrangements with unnamed parties in the media survey and several ‘closed’ or un-
named submissions to the inquiries, it is possible that there was more overlap between the media 
and reform cohorts than is readily apparent. 
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the role of genetic connectedness, and the incidence of payment and evasive 
travel. Are intended parents using their own gametes (or those of the birth mother 
or an egg donor)? Is money being paid to birth mothers? Are intended parents 
evading local law through domestic or international travel? Throughout the 
article I refer to the media survey and to the details of some of the families 
therein as a way of providing some context for reflection on the scope and 
applicability of the laws. I stress that while it is not known whether the reported 
experiences are in any way representative of surrogacy families in Australia more 
generally, in the continuing absence of empirical research it is also impossible to 
know in what way, if any, they are unrepresentative.17  
This article first outlines the context of Australian laws and reforms on surro-
gacy over the past 30 years, before offering a critical evaluation of the new 
parentage regimes. Although there has never been a uniform approach to surro-
gacy laws in Australia to date, there have been, broadly speaking, two distinct 
‘waves’ of inquiry and reform — the first in the 1980s and early 1990s, and the 
second in the mid to late 2000s. 
I I   THE F IRST WAVE :  MORAL PANIC  
Although surrogacy has long occured, the advent of IVF generated a range of 
new possibilities in terms of gestational and genetic roles. Genetic surrogacy 
(also referred to as ‘traditional’ or ‘partial’ surrogacy) involves the birth mother 
contributing her own egg. This means that genetic surrogacy can occur in 
informal circumstances through sex or home insemination, with little or no 
involvement from the state or the health profession. Gestational surrogacy, in 
which the birth mother has no genetic link to the child, is only possible with the 
use of IVF. Gestational surrogacy may occur with either the intended mother’s 
egg or that of an egg donor. The invention and progressive improvements of the 
techniques of embryo freezing and, more recently, egg freezing have also 
contributed to the growth of surrogacy, as they have enabled women undergoing 
procedures which destroy or severely impair fertility, such as hysterectomy and 
chemotherapy, to first harvest eggs with the intention of pursing parenthood 
through surrogacy at a later date. 
The first wave of Australian surrogacy reforms in the late 1980s and early 
1990s18 reflected the then contemporary ‘moral panic’ over the possibilities 
 
 17  Studies undertaken in cooperation with ART clinics, for example, will over represent gestational 
surrogacy because there is no necessity for ART when the birth mother’s own egg is used (ge-
netic surrogacy). Olga van den Akker suggests a marked contrast in practice of those pursuing 
surrogacy through IVF in clinic settings (which are almost exclusively gestational surrogacies) 
and those engaging in surrogacy conceptions informally: see ‘Functions and Responsibilities of 
Organizations Dealing with Surrogate Motherhood in the UK’ (1998) 1 Human Fertility 10. The 
Golombok study recruited surrogacy families through applicants for parentage transfer, leading 
to higher participation from intended parents than birth mothers: MacCallum et al, above n 13, 
1335; Golombok et al, ‘Non-Genetic and Non-Gestational Parenthood’, above n 13, 1919. 
 18  There were eight state and three federal inquiries which made recommendations about surrogacy 
between 1983 and 1991: Anita Stuhmcke, ‘Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards: Judicial and 
Legislative Trends in the Regulation of Surrogate Motherhood in the UK and Australia’ (2004) 
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posed by new assisted reproductive technologies, such as IVF and the use of 
donor gametes. Surrogacy was seen as occupying the outer end of the threat ART 
presented to ‘natural’ reproduction and the nuclear family. Such views are nicely 
exemplified by a 1988 report of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 
which stated that surrogacy ‘denigrates the position of women in society and the 
process of childbirth’19 and ‘holds dangers, both for the individuals involved and 
for the future development of childbearing and childcare arrangements in our 
society.’20 While only able to ascertain a handful of instances of surrogacy in 
Australia at that time, the Commission went on to recommend that surrogacy 
‘should be discouraged by all practicable legal and social means’21 including a 
public education campaign ‘to heighten awareness of the dangerous implications 
of general acceptance of the practice.’22  
Through the 1980s and early 1990s there was considerable divergence in the 
states’ original tranche of legislative responses.23 At one extreme, Queensland 
criminalised all forms of surrogacy, paid and unpaid,24 while at the other, New 
South Wales (‘NSW’) did not legislate at all until 2007, when it passed minimal-
ist ART laws prohibiting commercial surrogacy and deeming surrogacy agree-
ments unenforceable.25 Yet there were a number of key common elements in 
legislation around Australia, such as: 
• statutory clarification that surrogacy agreements were unenforceable as 
contracts; 
• wideranging prohibitions on advertising and on providing advice or acting 
as an intermediary for surrogacy; 
• criminalisation of ‘commercial’ or paid surrogacy; and, 
 
18 Australian Journal of Family Law 13, 23–9. The National Bioethics Consultative Committee 
(‘NBCC’) was alone among first wave inquiries in that it did not recommend various methods of 
prohibition and disincentive, but instead proposed that surrogacy arrangements should be per-
mitted within a framework of government control: National Bioethics Consultative Committee, 
Surrogacy Report 1 (1990); National Bioethics Consultative Committee, Discussion Paper on 
Surrogacy 2 – Implementation (1990). The NBCC reports were sufficiently ahead of their time 
that the committee was disbanded shortly afterwards, only to see the substance of many of its 
recommendations appear twenty years later in the second wave reforms. 
 19  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Artificial Conception Report 3: Surrogate 
Motherhood, Report No 60 (1988) 39. 
 20  Ibid 40. 
 21  Ibid 38 (recommendation 2) (emphasis added). 
 22  Ibid 53. 
 23  For a summary and discussion of the first wave, see generally Stuhmcke, above n 18; Lindy 
Willmott, ‘Surrogacy: Ill-Conceived Rights’ (2002) 10 Journal of Law and Medicine 198; Sey-
mour and Magri, above n 5; VLRC Report, above n 4, 164–5. 
 24  Surrogacy Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld) s 3. This legislation was the subject of widespread and 
sustained criticism: see, eg, Catherine Brown, Lindy Willmott and Ben White, ‘Surrogacy in 
Queensland: Should Altruism be a Crime?’ (2008) 20 Bond Law Review 1; Queensland Gov-
ernment, Report of the Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code, Recommendation 82 
(2000) <http://www.women.qld.gov.au>. 
 25  See generally Malcolm Smith, ‘Reviewing Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology in 
New South Wales: The Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW)’ (2008) 16 Journal 
of Law and Medicine 120. 
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• in the three jurisdictions which introduced strict statutory control of access 
to ART (South Australia (‘SA’), Victoria and Western Australia (‘WA’)), di-
rect and indirect exclusions from using fertility services to attempt surro-
gacy with IVF.26 
Of the jurisdictions without legislative control of ART, Tasmania and the Aus-
tralian Capital Territory (‘ACT’) implemented a 1991 recommendation of the 
Australian Health Ministers to prohibit fertility providers and other professionals 
from assisting with surrogacy.27 This meant that NSW was originally the only 
jurisdiction with open access to fertility services for surrogacy.28 Genetic or 
‘partial’ surrogacy, using the birth mother’s own egg and not involving IVF, was 
still possible everywhere in Australia except Queensland. In 1996, just two years 
after enacting its legislation prohibiting professional assistance with surrogacy, 
the ACT passed amendments such that it was then only an offence to medically 
assist commercial surrogacy. 
From the late 1990s through to the mid 2000s, the Canberra Fertility Centre in 
the ACT and Sydney IVF in NSW became the key providers of IVF for surrogacy 
in Australia29 (more providers have appeared in NSW in recent years).30 The 
Canberra Fertility Centre developed its own ethical guidelines which limit the 
provision of IVF to gestational surrogacy involving full genetic connection to 
both intended parents31 — this means that the intended parents must both be 
capable of providing viable gametes. Sydney IVF developed guidelines allowing 
gestational but not genetic surrogacy. Unlike the Canberra Fertility Centre, 
Sydney IVF does not require gametes from both intended parents, meaning that 
surrogacy can take place with donor eggs (although it will also only treat 
heterosexual couples for surrogacy).32 A clear preference for gestational surro-
gacy was thus established in early medical practice in Australia. Reform inquiries 
have also tended to favour gestational surrogacy, based on the evidence from 
 
 26  Note also that the Northern Territory Department of Health required ART practitioners to adhere 
to South Australian ART laws, although it was not bound to do so: Government of South Austra-
lia, Department of Health, ‘Reproductive Technology Legislation Around Australia’ (2007). 
 27  See ACT Law Reform Commission, Substitute Parentage Agreements, Report No 20 (2003) 10–
11 (‘ACT Report’) for text of the Health Ministers’ recommendation. This was the first failed 
attempt at ‘harmonisation’ of Australian surrogacy laws. The prohibition extended to the provi-
sion of all ‘technical’ or ‘professional’ services, thus also encompassing legal advice and coun-
selling or psychological assistance: Substitute Parent Agreements Act 1994 (ACT) s 8; Surro-
gacy Contracts Act 1993 (Tas) s 5 (both Acts have now been repealed). 
 28  Note that all ART practitioners throughout Australia are obliged to conform to national ethics 
guidelines, which prohibit involvement in paid surrogacy, advertising the provision of surrogacy 
services, and facilitating surrogacy, and urge caution in ensuring informed consent for unpaid 
surrogacy: see National Health and Medical Research Council, Ethical Guidelines on the use of 
Assisted Reproductive Technology in Clinical Practice and Research (June 2007) 57. 
 29  Queensland Report, above n 4, 45. 
 30  These providers include IVF Australia, Next Generation Fertility and Fertility East.. 
 31  See Canberra Fertility Centre, Surrogacy Information Booklet (2011) 3 
<http://www.canberrafertilitycentre.com.au/images/pdfs/w_CFC_Surrogacy_info.pdf>. 
 32  It still does not require gametes from both intended parents: see Mark Bowman, Medical 
Director of Sydney IVF: New South Wales Report, above n 4, 60–1, 84; Sydney IVF, How we 
can Help: Surrogacy (2011) <http://www.sydneyivf.com/How-we-can-help/Our-
Services/Assisted-Conception/Surrogacy/Surrogacy>. 
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fertility clinics and what appear to be widely held assumptions that disputes and 
issues of relinquishment are more likely to occur in genetic surrogacy.33  
The UK is a notable contrast in that genetic surrogacy appears to have been 
fairly common in the past. Research concerning those using the parentage 
transfer regime in the UK from 2000 to 2002, by Fiona Golombok and her team, 
found a relatively even split of genetic and gestational surrogacy arrangements.34 
Neither the Golombok research nor a number of qualitative research studies of 
birth mothers undertaken by Olga van den Akker found significant differences 
along genetic–non-genetic lines in either birth mothers’ or intended parents’ 
experiences of the pregnancy, relinquishment, or subsequent relationship with the 
child.35  
Genetic surrogacy does appear to be quite rare in Australia. Of the 69 arrange-
ments reported in the media survey, there were only five arrangements that were 
clearly identified as genetic surrogacy involving the birth mother’s own egg, and 
a further 13 where it was unclear whether the surrogacy was genetic or gesta-
tional.36 The vast majority of reported arrangements — 51 — were clearly 
identifiable as gestational surrogacy, and of these most involved both intended 
parents as genetic parents. In all, there were 29 gestational arrangements which 
involved both intended parents’ gametes,37 18 in which a donor egg and the 
intended father’s sperm were used,38 and one in which the intended mother’s egg 
and donor sperm were used. There were a further three arrangements in which it 
was clear that the intended mother’s egg had been or would be used, but unclear 
whether the intended mother had a male partner.39  
In the absence of research it is impossible to know whether the dominance of 
gestational surrogacy in Australia reflects the preference of intended parents 
and/or of birth mothers, arises as a result of the restrictive practice of fertility 
providers, or is a combination of all of the above. It seems apparent that genetic 
surrogacy is not a common practice, nor is surrogacy where neither intended 
parent is a genetic parent. However, the contribution of either donor eggs or 
donor sperm does appear to be relatively common. 
 
 33  See, eg, Recommendation 10 in Queensland Report, above n 4, 55; New South Wales Report, 
above n 4, 4, 91–3 (the Committee noted arguments against genetic surrogacy but refrained 
from making a recommendation). It was also influential that the one reported dispute in surro-
gacy in Australia involved a genetic surrogacy arrangement: Re Evelyn (1998) 23 Fam LR 53. 
 34  The Golombok study of 34 birth mothers comprised 56 per cent genetic and 44 per cent 
gestational arrangements: Jadva et al, above n 13, 2197. The overlapping cohort of 42 intended 
parents comprised 62 per cent genetic and 38 per cent gestational surrogacies: MacCallum et al, 
above n 13, 1337. 
 35  See the studies at above n 13. 
 36  All five of the genetic surrogacies were past arrangements. Of those that were unclear, six 
arrangements involved the intended father’s sperm but it was not clear whose egg was used and 
in seven arrangements it was unclear whose gametes were involved. 
 37  In 17 past arrangements both intended parents gametes had been used, in nine current arrange-
ments (which include one pregnancy) the intended parents proposed to use their own gametes, 
while in three future arrangement this was also proposed. 
 38  This cohort included 10 gay male couples, six heterosexual couples and one single man. 
 39  Two of these were future arrangements and one past. 
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I I I   THE SECOND WAVE :  T IGHTLY CONTROLLED TOLERANCE  
Prior to the second wave reforms, in state and territory law parentage of chil-
dren born through surrogacy clearly vested in the birth mother and her male 
partner, regardless of genetic connection40 and with limited or no ability to 
transfer legal parentage to the intended parents.41 In Australia, direct or ‘private’ 
adoption is unavailable: children cannot be placed with the intended parents by 
the birth mother, because children placed for adoption must be surrendered to 
state agencies who then decide placement. Indeed, in a number of jurisdictions it 
is an offence to make an ‘arrangement’ for a private adoption or change the 
residence of a child with a view to this end. Such offences will catch surrogacy 
arrangements if adoption is the intended outcome.42  
Some states provide a limited exception allowing direct adoption if the adop-
tive parent is a ‘relative’ of the child.43 Thus if the birth mother is the sister of an 
intended mother, for example, such that the intended mother is legally the child’s 
aunt, the intended mother and her partner may apply for a direct adoption. Even 
so, government agencies have strongly disapproved of this practice and actively 
opposed adoption applications in such circumstances.44 Additionally, in some 
states the relevant Minister or department head can exercise a discretion under 
the relevant adoption law to approve an unauthorised adoption placement.45 
Recently, intended parents in NSW who requested the exercise of such discretion 
were told that they must wait for six years before the relevant agency would 
proceed with their application.46  
The only generally accessible avenue for intended parents has been to apply to 
the Family Court or Federal Magistrates Court for ‘parental responsibility’ 
 
 40  ART parentage rules accord legal parentage to the birth mother and a consenting partner 
regardless of the genetic parentage of either: see generally Jenni Millbank, ‘De Facto Relation-
ships, Same-Sex and Surrogate Parents: Exploring the Scope and Effects of the 2008 Federal 
Relationship Reforms’ (2009) 23 Australian Journal of Family Law 160, 171–6. As there re-
mains no central definition of ‘parent’ or ‘child’ in federal law, the position is more complex and 
uncertain. 
 41  Under Commonwealth law, intended parents can apply for residence and parental responsibility 
orders because the ability to apply for and be granted such orders is not limited to legal parents 
— orders may be granted in favour of ‘any other person concerned with the care, welfare or 
development of the child’: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65C(c). 
 42  See, eg, Adoption Act 1994 (WA) s 8, discussed in Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, 
Legislative Council, 13 November 2007, 6924 (Giz Watson). 
 43  Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) s 87(2)(a); Adoption Act 1984 (Vic) s 122(2). Note that in 1997 the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission specifically recommended the continued exclusion 
of surrogacy arrangements from adoption law: New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 
Review of the Adoption of Children Act 1965 (NSW), Report No 81 (1997) 488 (Recommenda-
tions 107–8). 
 44  See, eg, the submissions of the NSW Department of Community Services opposing adoption in 
Re A and B (2000) 26 Fam LR 317 and Re D and E (2000) 26 Fam LR 310. See also the attempt 
of a local authority to make twins born through surrogacy wards of the state in an early English 
case: Re W [1991] Fam Law 180. 
 45  See, eg, Adoption Act 2000 (NSW) ss 10, 11. 
 46 David Norman, Submission No 18 to Standing Committee on Law and Justice, Inquiry into 
Legislation on Altruistic Surrogacy in NSW, 25 September 2008. 
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through parenting orders.47 Such orders authorise intended parents to make 
educational and medical decisions for the child and allow for the issue of a 
passport, but do not endure after the child turns 18 and do not grant parental 
status as such. Some commentators have argued that the evolution of the flexible 
legal concept of ‘parental responsibility’ is positive, and that the concept can 
encapsulate the complexity of multiple genetic and social parents through ART 
and surrogacy, as well as through other forms of ‘fragmented’ parentage.48  
However, I believe that parental responsibility alone is inadequate for the needs 
of surrogacy families due to its temporary and circumscribed nature. Parental 
responsibility orders do not impact on any of the web of laws that automatically 
grant vital rights to children, such as inheritance and other compensation laws, as 
well as rights that flow from extended family relationships. So, for example, a 
child who is the subject of parental responsibility orders does not become 
automatically eligible under intestacy laws to inherit from their intended parents, 
nor do they gain any form of legal relationship with grandparents, or even with 
other siblings if the children have been born to different birth mothers. In 
addition, parental responsibility orders do not allow for the reissue of a birth 
certificate listing the intended parents. Birth certificates have both a symbolic 
value and a practical purpose.49 In the absence of a birth certificate, surrogacy 
families must present themselves as not-parents, using documents that have been 
authorised by the birth parents or court orders proving they hold responsibility 
for a myriad of dealings with government and other agencies. In doing so they are 
constantly exposing and explaining the circumstances of the child’s conception 
and birth to others. 
In the mid 2000s a second wave of inquiry and reform commenced.50 This 
renewed interest was prompted by:  
• several surrogacy families approaching state and territory courts for decla-
rations of legal parentage (all of which were denied);51  
 
 47  Applications for parenting orders may be heard by either the Family Court of Australia or the 
Federal Magistrates Court: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 33B. Such applications may be brought 
by those who are not legal parents: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 65C(c). In addition, the Family 
Court of Western Australia may make orders in favour of someone other than a parent: Family 
Court Act 1997 (WA) s 85. 
 48  See, eg, Craig Lind and Tom Hewitt, ‘Law and the Complexities of Parenting: Parental Status 
and Parental Function’ (2009) 31 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 391. 
 49  See generally Liz Short, ‘“It Makes the World of Difference”: Benefits for Children of Lesbian 
Parents of Having Their Parents Legally Recognised as Their Parents’ (2007) 3 Gay and Lesbian 
Issues and Psychology Review 5. 
 50 While other inquiries produced reports in the intervening years — see, eg, Legislative Assembly 
Select Committee on the Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA), Parliament of West-
ern Australia, Report (1999); Queensland Government, above n 24 — their recommendations 
were not implemented. 
 51  See, eg, PJ v DOCS [1999] NSWSC 340 (6 April 1999); Re an Application Pursuant to the 
Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 [2000] ACTSC 39 (5 May 2000). The latter 
case led to the Artificial Conception Amendment Act 2000 (ACT) and is highlighted as the 
genesis of the 2003 ACT inquiry: ACT Report, above n 27, 2–4. See also Re Michael (Surrogacy 
Arrangements) (2009) 41 Fam LR 694. 
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• applications for adoption (in the few instances where intended parents were 
eligible for direct adoption because the birth mother was related to one of 
them);52 and  
• a number of applications to the Family Court of Australia for parental 
responsibility,53 in which several of the judgments called for legislative re-
form.54  
In addition, in 2006 a federal Senator announced the birth of his child through 
a surrogacy arrangement, bringing significant attention and increasing public 
sympathy concerning the issue.55 
In framing this new era of openness to surrogacy, the twin themes of ‘altruism’ 
and ‘national harmony’ dominated. However, while reforms were characterised as 
part of a uniform law or ‘harmonisation’ initiative to bring the various states’ 
divergent approaches into line with each other, this rhetoric was largely baseless. 
In 2007 the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General (‘SCAG’) began discus-
sions and in 2009 issued a proposal for a ‘national model to harmonise regulation 
of surrogacy’, the emphasis of which was on legal parentage. The guiding 
principles proposed by the paper were that:  
• parentage orders are to be made in the best interests of the child; 
• intervention of the law in people’s private lives should be kept to a mini-
mum; and 
• the model should seek to avoid legal dispute between the birth parent(s) 
and the intended parents.56 
However, it is notable that, by the time this proposal was issued, legislation had 
already been passed in the ACT, Victoria and WA which, as we will see below, 
took widely different approaches to defining eligibility for parentage transfers. 
Reforms passed afterwards in Queensland, SA and NSW and more recently 
introduced inTasmania, have continued to produce variations in approach. 
 
 52  See, eg, W: Re Adoption (1998) 23 Fam LR 538; Re A and B (2000) 26 Fam LR 317; Re D and 
E (2000) 26 Fam LR 310. 
 53  See, eg, Re Mark (2004) 31 Fam LR 162; King and Tamsin [2008] FamCA 309 (28 April 2008); 
Raines and Curtin [2007] FamCA 1295 (15 October 2007); Cadet and Scribe [2007] FamCA 
1498 (5 November 2007). 
 54  See, eg, Re an Application Pursuant to the Births Deaths and Marriages Registration Act 1997 
[2000] ACTSC 39 (5 May 2000) [14] (Crispin J); Re Mark (2004) 31 Fam LR 162, 174 
(Brown J). 
 55  Senator Conroy and his partner Paula Benson had a daughter with the assistance two female 
friends, one of whom was the birth mother and the other an egg donor. Of the nearly 200 press 
reports see, eg, Katharine Murphy, ‘The Senator, the Surrogate and the New Baby’, The Age 
(Melbourne), 7 November 2006, 1; Phillip Coorey, ‘Surrogate Mothers for MP’s Baby’, The 
Sydney Morning Herald, 7 November 2006, 1; Sue Dunlevy, ‘I’ll Carry Your Baby — Surrogate 
Mother Volunteered to Help Senator’, The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 8 November 2006, 7. For 
discussion of the role of discourse in the parliamentary debates and media coverage see Jenni 
Millbank, ‘From Alice and Evelyn to Isabella: Exploring the Narratives and Norms of “New” 
Surrogacy in Australia’ (forthcoming). 
 56  SCAG Paper, above n 5, 2. 
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There was harmony, however, inasmuch as all state governments were unani-
mous in limiting discussion to unpaid surrogacy. The Queensland and NSW 
parliamentary inquiries self-consciously titled their reports as concerning 
‘altruistic’ surrogacy, while the terms of reference of all of the other inquiries 
were similarly circumscribed.57 Any consideration of paid or ‘commercial’ 
surrogacy was completely excluded from discussion. So, for example, the SCAG 
paper is prefaced by the statement that 
[t]he proposed model would not permit commercial surrogacy. That practice is 
already unlawful throughout Australia. It is judged that commercial surrogacy 
commodifies the child and the surrogate mother, and risks the exploitation of 
poor families for the benefit of rich ones. Consequently, when this paper refers 
to surrogacy, it refers to an arrangement in which the surrogate receives no fi-
nancial benefit (other than reimbursement for losses and expenses).58 
This limited focus had significant consequences for the parentage laws which 
followed, as inquiries simply did not address the problem of parentage for 
children born through ‘commercial’ surrogacy.  
The benefit of the second wave focus on ‘altruism’ was that it did allow move-
ment beyond the moral panic of the first wave into a frame of reference that was 
constructed as cautious but realistic about the fact that surrogacy families are in 
existence and apparently becoming more common. The increasingly pragmatic 
attitude of government in the second wave is exemplified by the 2008 Queen-
sland Parliamentary Committee Report, which stated that ‘for a small group of 
people … altruistic surrogacy provides the only realistic opportunity to create 
family’ and concluded that the role of the state is ‘to create an environment that 
maximises the possibility for success and happiness for people who create their 
families through altruistic surrogacy arrangements rather than disadvantages or 
stigmatises them.’59 Given that Queensland had for the preceding twenty years 
threatened, and in several instances initiated, criminal prosecutions for engaging 
in any form of surrogacy,60 these statements represent a seismic shift in view. In a 
similar vein, Tasmania, which for the previous 17 years had criminalised profes-
sional assistance with surrogacy , released its Surrogacy Bill in late 2010 with an 
explanatory document stating that the Bill would ‘open a way to assist people to 
realise their dreams of making a family.’61 
 
 57  See, eg, VLRC Report, above n 4, 5, where it is stated that ‘[t]he commission is also requested to 
consider the meaning and efficacy of sections 8, 20 and 59 [of the Infertility Treatment Act 1995 
(Vic)] in relation to altruistic surrogacy, and clarification of the legal status of any child born of 
such an arrangement’ (emphasis added). 
 58  SCAG Paper, above n 5, 4–5. 
 59  Queensland Report, above n 4, 23. 
 60  The Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld) s 3 imposed a maximum penalty of 100 penalty units 
or three years imprisonment for entering into, or offering to enter into, a surrogacy arrangement, 
whether in Queensland or elsewhere (if the persons involved were ordinarily resident in Queen-
sland at the time the event occurred). The Queensland Report noted five prosecutions, with 
‘most’ charges dismissed and one good behaviour bond recorded: Queensland Report, above 
n 4, 9.  
 61  Department of Justice (Tas), Proposed Tasmanian Surrogacy Bill: Exposure Bill, 1 
<http://www.justice.tas.gov.au/legislationreview/reviews/surrogacy_bill_2010_consultation>. 
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IV  THE NEW PARENTAGE REGIMES  
The Australian reforms all introduced a post-birth, consent based parentage 
transfer process with various preconditions and court oversight. Transferring 
legal parentage to the intended parents from the birth mother (and her partner, if 
any) is justified by and consistent with a functional family approach to relation-
ship law more broadly.62 When a child is being raised by his or her intended 
parents, it is those intended parents who are the primary caregivers and who are 
therefore in need of a legal relationship with the child that will protect and assist 
in the process of parenting. I have argued elsewhere that this need is irrespective 
of any partial or complete genetic link between the child and the intended 
parents; it is not about an entitlement to parental status but, rather, it is about who 
is doing parenting.63  
A court-based post-birth transfer process for surrogacy parentage has been used 
in the United Kingdom since 1994.64 Unlike the pre-birth contractual model 
common in many states of the United States (‘US’),65 the UK approach is framed 
by key safeguards in that it allows the birth mother to change her mind before 
(and for some time after) the birth,66 and requires scrutiny of the parties’ consent 
and an assessment of the child’s best interests after the child has come into 
existence.67 In a post-birth process, the consent of the birth mother must be both 
informed and continuing. A post-birth transfer further protects the interests of the 
birth mother by enhancing her ability to control the pregnancy and birth process. 
The Australian laws on parentage transfer contain the above elements because 
they were modelled on the UK approach.68 Yet this article demonstrates that the 
Australian states have progressively departed from the UK model by adding 
increasingly complex layers of procedural and substantive requirements, such 
that there is now only a dim resemblance between the Australian and UK 
approaches to parentage in surrogacy. Rules on payment and on conception 
within the jurisdiction, along with additional eligibility criteria discussed below, 
 
 62  See Jenni Millbank, ‘Unlikely Fissures and Uneasy Resonances: Lesbian Co-Mothers, Surrogate 
Parenthood and Fathers’ Rights’ (2008) 16 Feminist Legal Studies 141. See also Millbank, ‘De 
Facto Relationships, Same-Sex and Surrogate Parents’, above n 40. 
 63  Millbank, ‘Unlikely Fissures and Uneasy Resonances,’ above n 62, 161–4. 
 64  The UK provisions for parental orders in surrogacy were part of the original Human Fertilisa-
tion and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) regulating ART (s 30), although they did not become 
operative until 1994. These provisions are discussed in Eric Blyth, ‘Surrogacy arrangements in 
Britain: Policy and Practice Issues for Professionals’ (1998) 1 Human Fertility 3. 
 65  See generally Steven H Snyder and Mary Patricia Byrn, ‘The Use of Pre-Birth Parentage Orders 
in Surrogacy Proceedings’ (2005) 39 Family Law Quarterly 633. 
 66  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (UK) s 54, replacing the earlier Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 30). 
 67  Ibid. 
 68  The exception is WA, which departed from the underlying principle of consent by allowing for 
the transfer of parentage despite the objection of the birth mother if she is not genetically related 
to the child and one of the intended parents is so related: see Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) ss 21(3), 
(4). Tasmania uncritically duplicated this provision: Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas) s 14(5). 
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mean that the Australian systems are much narrower in scope than the UK 
model.69 
The first regime for parentage transfer in Australia was introduced in the ACT 
in 2004 as part of a wider package of reforms to that territory’s adoption and 
assisted reproduction parentage laws.70 The ACT legislation was closely based 
upon s 30 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK). As in the 
UK, in the ACT the court is empowered to permit transfer of parentage if: 
• the child is between six weeks and six months old;71 
• the child is living with the intended parents;72 
• the intended parents live within the jurisdiction;73 
• the arrangement involves two intended parents;74  
• the intended parents are at least 18 years of age;75 
• at least one intended parent is a genetic parent of the child;76 and 
• there was no payment of money or other benefit to the birth mother (the 
agreement was not ‘commercial’).77 
While the original 1990 UK provisions were limited to intended parents who 
were married, the ACT scheme was open to unmarried and same-sex couples (as 
is the UK regime now, following amendments in 2008).78 However, the ACT 
regime is also narrower than the UK system in three important respects. The ACT 
only allows the court to grant a parentage transfer if: 
• the birth mother is not a genetic parent to the child (ie only gestational and 
not genetic surrogacy);79 and 
• assisted conception took place within the ACT.80  
 
 69  While the UK regime has been criticised as inflexible, for example because it does not allow any 
discretion for transfer after the age of 6 months (see, eg, Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] 
EWHC 3030 (Fam) (9 December 2008) [12] (Hedley J)), its restrictions are minor in compari-
son with much of the Australian law. 
 70  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) pt 2 div 2.5. This Act extended more limited ad hoc provisions that 
had been in place since 2000 as recommended by the ACT Report, above n 27. 
 71  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 25(3). 
 72  Ibid s 26(3)(a). While this provision is phrased as a mandatory consideration rather than a 
requirement, it is unclear whether the court could in fact make the order if the child is not living 
with the intended parents. 
 73  Ibid s 24(e). 
 74  Ibid s 24(c). 
 75  Ibid s 26(3)(b). While this provision is phrased as a mandatory consideration rather than a 
requirement, it is unclear whether the court could in fact make the order if the intended parents 
were not at least 18 years of age. 
 76  Ibid s 24(d). 
 77  Ibid ss 24(c), 26(3)(d). 
 78  See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (UK) s 54. This provision became operative 
in April 2009. 
 79  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 24(b); nor can her partner be a genetic parent (ie a sperm or egg 
donor in the surrogacy). 
 80  Ibid s 24(a). 
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In addition, there is no power in the ACT legislation for the court to retrospec-
tively ‘authorise’ payments. 
It is difficult to know what was behind these three variations, given that no 
rationale was offered for any of them in the parliamentary materials surrounding 
the reforms.81 It is possible that the exclusion of genetic surrogacy was influ-
enced by the practice of the only clinic within the ACT which undertook IVF for 
surrogacy at that time.82 Given that the stringent ethics and assessment processes 
undertaken by the Canberra Fertility Centre were limited to gestational surrogacy, 
it is also possible that the jurisdictional limit was intended to further entrench the 
dominance of this practice.  
The third area of divergence, concerning the rules on payment, is likewise 
unexplained in supporting materials. The text of the ACT legislation prohibiting 
payment exactly duplicated the UK law in specifying that payment must not be 
provided in connection with the making of the parenting order, the surrogacy 
agreement, the relinquishment of the child or the arrangements concerning the 
order.83 Yet there was one critical omission: the UK payment provisions are 
followed by the addendum, ‘unless authorised by the court’.84 This addendum is 
very significant because without it the courts have no power to grant transfer of 
parentage if payment characterised as ‘valuable consideration’ or ‘material 
benefit’ has changed hands.  
All other Australian states have subsequently followed the ACT and departed 
from the UK approach by omitting the discretionary power to authorise payment 
so as to grant parentage transfer. SA and Victoria also followed the narrower 
ACT approach by requiring that conception take place within the jurisdiction in 
order for intended parents to be eligible to apply for parentage transfer.85 WA 
does not actually mandate conception in the jurisdiction, but presumes that 
participants will be using WA ART clinics and has made it very difficult to do 
otherwise.86 Queensland, NSW and Tasmania did not introduce a jurisdictional 
limit regarding conception. On the question of the genetic connection between 
birth mother and child have all the other Australian jurisdictions departed from 
the ACT template and taken the more liberal UK approach by including both 
genetic and gestational surrogacy in parentage transfer regimes.87 
 
 81  The Explanatory Statement notes the requirements that there be no genetic connection between 
the birth mother and child and that conception occur within the jurisdiction, but does not ex-
plain the reasons for them: Explanatory Statement, Parentage Bill 2003 (ACT) 8. Similarly, 
reference to requirements in parliamentary debates include no further explanation: Australian 
Capital Territory, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 February 2004, 122–6 (Mr 
Stanhope, Chief Minister). 
 82  See Canberra Fertility Centre, above n 31. 
 83  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 26(3)(d); cf Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) 
s 30(7). 
 84  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 30(7) (emphasis added). 
 85 Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HB(2)(c); Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) 
s (20)(1)(a).  
 86  See discussion at below n 112. 
 87  See, eg, Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 5, where there is no consideration of whether the birth 
mother or her spouse is a genetic parent of the surrogate child. Note that Victoria excludes 
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As the various states developed their own regimes, they introduced additional 
restrictive eligibility requirements and exacting mandatory processes. In the ACT, 
SA, Queensland and Tasmania these requirements are contained only in parent-
age transfer laws.88 In NSW and WA some requirements have been embedded in 
ART regulation instead, although most requirements are contained in the parent-
age laws.89 In Victoria there is an approval process under ART legislation90 and 
then a dual pathway in parentage laws, with additional procedural requirements 
for those who have not conceived through approved IVF by a licensed ART 
provider.91 Taken together, these eligibility rules include requirements that the 
birth mother: 
• is at least 25 years old (NSW, Queensland, Victoria, WA);92 
• has already given birth to her own live child (Victoria if licensed ART is 
used, WA unless there are ‘exceptional circumstances’);93 and 
• is not a genetic parent to the child (ACT, Victoria if licensed ART is 
used).94 
In addition, the intended parents are required to: 
• be at least 25 years old (one or both Queensland, WA);95 
• be a couple, not an individual (ACT, SA);96  
• not be a man or male  couple (WA);97 
 
genetic surrogacy from licensed ART, but parents may still be eligible to have a Patient Review 
Panel authorise a non-complying surrogacy arrangement where the ‘circumstances of the pro-
posed surrogacy arrangement are exceptional’: Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) 
s 41. 
 88  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) pt 2 div 2.5; Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) pt 2B div 3; 
Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) ch 3; Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas) pt 4. 
 89  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) pt 3, div 2; Assisted Reproductive Technology Act 2007 (NSW) 
s 15A, pt 2 div 3, s 15A; Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) ss 16–17; Human Reproductive Technology 
Act 1991 (WA) s 23. 
 90  Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) ss 39–43. 
 91  Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) ss 22–3. 
 92  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 27(1); Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 22(2)(f) (this age requirement 
also applies to the birth mother’s spouse, if any); Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 
(Vic) s 40(1)(b); Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) s 23(2)(a); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) 
s 17(a)(i). The proposed age is 21 in the Tasmanian bill: Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas) cl 14(2)(b), 
but may be raised to 25 by the upper house: see note 6. 
 93  Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 40(1)(ac); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) 
s 17(a)(ii). 
 94  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 24(b); Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) 
s 40(1)(ab). 
 95  Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 22(2)(g)(i); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 19(1)(a). In NSW, both 
intended parents must be over 18, although if they are under 25 they face additional require-
ments: Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) ss 28, 29. 
 96  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 24(c); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HA(2)(a)(ii). 
However, one intended parent can apply for the order in certain circumstances, such as if their 
partner has died or they have separated after the arrangement was entered into but prior to the 
application. 
 97  Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) ss 19(1)(b), 19(2). This reflects the approach to ‘infertility’ and 
eligibility in WA, which centres on a woman requiring treatment (since 2002 she does not need 
to be in a heterosexual relationship): see the discussion about providing certainty to intended 
 
   
M.U.L.R. — Millbank — printed 21/06/2011 at 12:07 PM — page 18 of 44
  
18 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 35 
 
     
• be married or in a heterosexual de facto relationship for more than three 
years (SA);98  
• be classified as infertile or having a ‘need’ for surrogacy (NSW, Queen-
sland, SA, Victoria if licensed ART is used, WA).99 This expressly excludes 
age related infertility in WA, but does include ‘social infertility’ in NSW, 
Queensland and Victoria; 
• reside within the jurisdiction (ACT, NSW, Queensland, SA, Tasmania, 
Victoria, WA).100 Queensland and Tasmania are the only states where the 
court has the ability to waive this requirement;101 
• be fit and proper parents (SA);102 and 
• have at least intended parent who is a genetic parent of the child (ACT, 
SA).103  
Finally, the surrogacy agreement must be: 
• in writing (NSW, Queensland, SA, WA; in WA any egg or sperm donor 
must also be party to the agreement);104 
• witnessed by a lawyer (SA);105 
• entered into prior to the pregnancy (ACT, NSW, Queensland, SA, Tasma-
nia, Victoria, WA);106 
• the subject of independent and/or certified counselling for all parties (ACT, 
NSW, Queensland, SA, Tasmania, Victoria, WA).107 This must take place 
 
parents in WA, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 4 September 2007, 4765–78. See 
also Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Council, 19 June 2008, 4173–82. 
There were numerous unsuccessful attempts to amend the Bill through 2007 and 2008 in order 
to exclude single women from being eligible to be intended parents. 
 98  Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HA(2)(b)(iii). 
 99  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 30; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) ss 14, 22(2)(d); Family Relation-
ships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HA(2)(b)(v); Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) 
s 40(1)(a); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) ss 17(d), 19(1)–(3). 
100  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 24(e); Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 32; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) 
s 22(2)(g)(ii); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HB(2)(b); Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas) 
cl 14(2)(e)(ii); Status of Children Act 1975 (Vic) s 20(1)(b); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) 
s 19(1)(a). 
101  Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 23(2); Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas) cl 14(3)(a). 
102  Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HB(10). 
103  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 24(d); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA), s 10HA(2)(viii)(B) 
(unless both intending parents are infertile or should not be a genetic parent of the child for a 
medical reason: ss 10HA(2)(viii)(B), 10HA(5)). 
104  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 34; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 22(2)(e)(v); Family Relationships 
Act 1975 (SA) s 10HA(6); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 17(b). It appears likely that Tasmania 
will also include this requirement, as the government has indicated its intention to move an 
amendment to the current bill to require writing: Tasmania, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative 
Council, 14 June 2011, 10 (Parkinson). 
105  Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HA(6)(c). 
106  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 23; Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 24; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) 
ss 7(1), 22(2)(e)(iv); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HA(2)(a)(i); Surrogacy Bill 2011 
(Tas) cl 4(5); Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 3; Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) 
ss 3, 17(e). 
   
M.U.L.R. — Millbank — printed 21/06/2011 at 12:07 PM — page 19 of 44
  
2011] The New Surrogacy Parentage Laws in Australia 19 
 
     
prior to the pregnancy in Queensland, SA, Victoria and WA, and will be re-
quired twice in Tasmania: prior to the pregnancy and again, post-birth but 
prior to the parentage transfer; 
• the subject of legal advice (NSW, Queensland, SA, Tasmania, Victoria, 
WA).108 In all states except Victoria this must be certified independent legal 
advice received prior to the pregnancy; and 
• supported by the report of a designated counsellor (NSW, Queensland, SA, 
Victoria if licensed ART is used).109 In all states except Victoria this must 
involve explicit approval for the parentage transfer itself. 
Furthermore, the arrangement must involve: 
• a ‘cooling off period’ of three months (WA);110 
• assisted conception within the jurisdiction (ACT, SA, Victoria).111 While 
WA does not expressly require this, it is implicit in the structure of the ap-
proval process which centres the WA ART system (such that approval 
would be very hard to get if conception did not occur within the jurisdic-
tion);112 
 
107  Counselling is a relevant consideration but not a mandatory requirement in the ACT: Parentage 
Act 2004 (ACT) s 26(3)(e). See also Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 35; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) 
s 22(2)(e)(ii); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) ss 10HA(2)(vi)–(vii), (3); Surrogacy Bill 
2011 (Tas) cl 14(2)(c); Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) ss 40(1)(c), 40(2), 43; 
Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) s 23(2)(b); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 17(c)(i); Surrogacy 
Regulations 2009 (WA) reg 4. 
108  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 36; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) ss 22(2)(e), 30; Family Relation-
ships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HA(6)(c); Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas) cl 14(2)(a)(i); Assisted Reproduc-
tive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) ss 40(1)(c), 43(c); Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) 
s 23(2)(b)(iii); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 17(c)(iii); Surrogacy Regulations 2009 (WA) 
reg 5(2)(f). 
109  NSW requires the counsellor’s opinion as to whether the parentage transfer is in the child’s best 
interests and the reasons for that opinion: Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) ss 17(1)–(2). Queensland 
requires a counsellor’s report supporting parentage transfer: Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) 
ss 22(2)(i), 32 (although this requirement can be dispensed with in exceptional circumstances: 
s 23(2)). SA requires a statement by the counsellor that the surrogacy agreement will not jeop-
ardise a resulting child’s welfare: Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) ss 10HA(2)(vii), 
(3)(b)(i)–(ii). See also Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) ss 40(2)(a), 43(a)–(b).  
110  Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 17(c). 
111  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 24(a); Family Relationships Act 1975 (SA) s 10HA(2)(b)(viii)(A); 
Status of Children Act 1975 (Vic) s 20(1)(a). 
112  A parentage order is not possible without prior approval of the arrangement by the Western 
Australian Reproductive Technology Council (‘RTC’): Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 16(1). Such 
approval requires, among other things, counselling by a counsellor who must also be approved 
by the RTC: Surrogacy Regulations 2009 (WA) reg 3. Both the RTC website and the approval 
forms direct participants to designated clinic surrogacy coordinators (which clinics are required 
to have by the Surrogacy Directions 2009 (WA) cl 8) — it is not apparent that the form may be 
submitted without the involvement of a clinic. For example, the RTC website states that one may 
‘View the application forms required to be submitted to the Council by the clinic surrogacy 
coordinator’: <http://www.rtc.org.au/consumer/surrogacy_wa.html> (emphasis added). The 
Application Form for arranged parents commences with the statement: ‘This form is to be com-
pleted by the applicant(s) with the assistance of the Clinic Surrogacy Co-ordinator’. Nonethe-
less, the RTC has confirmed that it is able to approve an arrangement which involved sex and 
took place outside the jurisdiction if the parties undertook all compliance measures in advance 
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• prior application and approval of all parties following an assessment by a 
government appointed tribunal (Victoria if licensed ART is used, WA);113 
• a court approved plan addressing contact and communication between the 
parties and what information will be provided to the child (WA);114 and 
• a criminal record check and child protection check for all parties (Victoria 
if licensed ART used).115 
While no state requires all of the above criteria to be met, many states require 
several. One WA MP remarked in the course of debates, ‘I am certain that if 
everyone were subjected to the tests in this bill before they entered into parent-
hood, we would have a severe population shortage very quickly.’116 It is hard to 
see how these rules accord with the guiding principle agreed to in 2009 by the 
SCAG that a nationally consistent approach to surrogacy law should aim to keep 
the intervention of the law in people’s private lives ‘to a minimum’.117 
Perhaps because of its unique history in criminalising all forms of surrogacy, 
Queensland was the most open to reflection on the appropriate role of govern-
ment in regulating family formulation. The Queensland report incorporated the 
principles of non-discrimination and autonomy in its discussion and recom-
mended that the role of government should be one which: 
Balances the prevention of harm and the protection of personal liberty in the 
creation of families through altruistic surrogacy; and 
Seeks parity in policy development for families created through altruistic surro-
gacy with other families created through assisted reproductive technology 
(ART) or natural conception.118 
The reforms in Queensland displayed a markedly more liberal approach to 
eligibility for parentage than the reforms which preceded them in other states, 
and, indeed, ultimately reflected a less interventionalist approach than Queen-
sland’s own reform document had recommended.119 The Explanatory Memoran-
dum to the legislation states: 
 
within WA: email from Nyaree Jacobsen, Acting Executive Officer, RTC, to Jenni Millbank, 22 
November 2010. 
113  Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 39; Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) ss 16(1). The 
Queensland and New South Wales inquiries also recommended this, but these recommendations 
were not implemented: Queensland Report, above n 4, 62 (recommendation 12); New South 
Wales Report, above n 4, 101 (recommendation 5). 
114  Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) ss 21(2)(f), 22. 
115  Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 (Vic) s 42. Victoria requires a criminal background 
check on all parties undertaking ART; for surrogacy, this means the intended parents, birth 
mother and her partner, if any. 
116 Western Australia, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 2 December 2008, 761 (A J 
Waddell). 
117  See SCAG Paper, above n 5, 2. 
118  Queensland Report, above n 4, 30. 
119  Notably, Queensland did not introduce an approval panel or a mandatory ‘cooling-off’ period 
recommended in the Queensland Report, above n 4, 60–1.  
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It is inconsistent with the principle that the welfare and best interests of the 
child are paramount to exclude the intended parent/s from applying for a par-
entage order because of their relationship status. All children are entitled to the 
same legal protections and certainty regardless of the nature of the relationship 
of their parents or the circumstances that resulted in their conception and 
birth.120 
Unlike the jurisdictions which preceded it in implementing reform, Queensland 
has no requirement of genetic connection between intended parent(s) and child, 
no restriction on the genetic connection between birth mother and child, no 
prescription as to the method of conception or the sexual orientation or marital 
status of the intended parents, and no restriction on the intended parent being a 
single person rather than part of a couple. In light of recent history in which 
couples from Queensland covertly travelled to other states121 and countries to 
engage in surrogacy because it was criminalised at home, and given that such 
conduct was also criminal through extraterritorial provisions in Queensland 
law,122 it is highly significant that Queensland decided to make its parental 
transfer regime open to intended parents regardless of the place of conception.  
It appears that Queensland tipped the balance in terms of the reform trajectory 
Australia-wide. 123 When NSW and Tasmania introduced their laws in late 2010 
and early 2011 respectively, both adopted the less prescriptive Queensland 
approach, duplicating all of the above elements.124 Additionally, Queensland 
allows the court discretion to grant parentage orders if the intended parents are 
not ordinarily resident within the jurisdiction.125 Tasmania likewise introduced 
this discretion. 
While most states introduced legislative clarification of ‘reasonable ex-
penses’126 and NSW, Queensland, Tasmania and WA also took the step of making 
agreements for the payment of such expenses enforceable at the behest of the 
birth mother,127 the pre-existing provisions criminalising paid or ‘commercial’ 
surrogacy were largely retained. In the ACT and Queensland the reforms simply 
replicated earlier extraterritorial provisions such that offences include acts 
 
120  Explanatory Notes, Surrogacy Bill 2009 (Qld) 7. 
121  See, eg, Queensland Report, above n 4, 11. 
122  Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld) s 3(2)(b). 
123  However, the juxtaposition of these relaxed substantive and strict procedural elements may also 
prove problematic. For example, requiring exhaustive counselling and legal advice — with 
written agreements and certificates of compliance prior to conception, even though conception 
can take place in highly informal circumstances (including home insemination or sex) — may 
mean that parties are unaware of the requirements until it is too late (although note that Queen-
sland and Tasmania do have greater flexibility than most other states in that many procedural 
requirements may be waived by the Court in exceptional circumstances: Surrogacy Act 2010 
(Qld) s 23; Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas cl 14(3))). 
124 Recall, however that the Tasmanian bill has been refered to committee by the upper house, and 
so may ultimately pass in a more restrictive form than the current bill: see note 6. 
125  Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 23(2). 
126  See, eg, Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 7; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 11; Surrogacy Act 2008 
(WA) s 6. 
127  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 6(2); Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 15(2); Surrogacy Bill 2011 (Tas) 
cl 8(2); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 7(3). 
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undertaken outside the jurisdiction by those ordinarily resident there.128 Thus, 
ACT residents who undertake paid surrogacy outside the ACT continue to face 
the same criminal sanctions that they did prior to reform. In Queensland, whereas 
pre-reform all surrogacy anywhere was criminalised, post-reform only paid 
surrogacy anywhere attracts penalty.129 NSW is alone in actually introducing 
extraterritorial criminal offences as part of the reforms.130 This issue will be 
discussed in some detail below in Part VI (‘Travel and Payment’). 
Transfer of legal parentage under the state and territory regimes is carried into 
the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘FLA’) through s 60HB and specific prescription 
of the various state surrogacy laws.131 This status is in turn reflected in various 
other federal Acts which adopt the FLA s 60HB definition of ‘parent’.132 How-
ever, there remains no central definition of ‘parent’ and ‘child’ in federal law and 
each Act is open to a purposive interpretation based upon its own terms. It 
appears, therefore, that parents through surrogacy may be legal parents under 
some, but not other, federal Acts, and that this uncertainty prevails whether or not 
they have undertaken the state transfer process. This issue will be discussed in 
relation to the meaning of ‘parent’ in provisions on citizenship by descent below 
in Part VIII (‘The Consequences of the Australian Approach for Legal Parentage 
and Australian Citizenship’). 
V  ACCESSIBILITY  
While in the modern era the rules of legal parentage have confounded the 
intention of parents in surrogacy and led to contradictory legal, social and genetic 
parentage for children born in this way, they were not created in order to exclude 
parties in surrogacy. It is problematic that the second wave reforms introduced 
parentage rules that were crafted as part of an overarching regulatory approach 
with the intention to modify and contain the (presumptively unruly and unethical) 
pre-conception behaviour of intended parents, and to deny them parentage if they 
did not comply. In this sense the reforms contain echoes of the punitive laws of 
illegitimacy which were abolished in Australia decades ago.133 
Surrogacy raises genuine concerns about matters such as power imbalance, 
informed consent and relinquishment. However, I argue that a strict and inflexi-
ble approach to legal parentage is not an effective way for the state to address 
such concerns. A parentage regime which will only cover certain families if they 
 
128  Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 45; Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 54. 
129  In both the ACT and Queensland, the penalties post-reform remain identical to those pre-reform: 
Substitute Parent Agreements Act 1994 (ACT) s 5 cf Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) s 41 (100 
penalty units or imprisonment for one year, or both); Surrogate Parenthood Act 1988 (Qld) s 3 
cf Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 56 (100 penalty units or imprisonment for three years).  
130  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 11. The penalty for paid surrogacy for an individual is 1000 
penalty units or imprisonment for two years, or both: s 8. 
131  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60HB; Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth) reg 12CAA. At the 
time of writing all of the state and territory  laws except Tasmania had been prescribed.  
132  See, eg, Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth) s 5; Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) 
s 8. 
133 See Anthony Dickey, Family Law, 4th ed (2002), 288-297. 
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behave in specific ways defies the fundamental rationale for creating a parentage 
transfer process in the first place — the pragmatic recognition that it is almost 
always in a child’s interests to have a legal relationship with the parents who are 
raising him or her. Moreover, there are obvious practical difficulties posed by the 
fact that a post-birth incentive is being used to try to induce certain kinds of 
parental behaviour prior to conception. Such difficulties are even more acute in 
the states without ART laws that act as pre-emptive ‘gatekeepers’. If parties 
cannot or will not comply, a court process that takes place weeks or months after 
birth means that the state is shutting the gate to legal parentage well and truly 
after the horse has bolted. Since Australian states all have different and ever more 
detailed substantive requirements as well as mandatory pre-conception processes, 
the likelihood of mistaken non-compliance increases. 
It is not improbable that parties will enter into a surrogacy arrangement in 
ignorance of one or more key elements of their state law. There are already 
numerous UK cases in which intended parents were mistaken about major 
substantive requirements of the law (such as rules on payment, on domicile, on 
legal parentage and on the domestic validity of birth certificates issued overseas), 
even when they had received professional advice, including legal advice in 
advance of the arrangement.134 Likewise, both press reports and recent Australian 
case law suggest a high level of confusion among intended parents and their legal 
advisers about fundamental matters such as the rules of legal parentage. A very 
common mistake is the assumption that male intended parents are legal parents 
simply because they are genetic parents, even though conception has taken place 
using assisted means.135 Another common misunderstanding is that being named 
on the birth certificate decisively establishes legal parentage. Intended parents 
frequently believe that, for example, listing a male genetic parent on the birth 
certificate grants him legal status as a parent,136 or having both intended parents 
 
134  See, eg, Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam) (9 December 2008) 
(discussed in detail below in Part VII). In that case the intended parents had made extensive 
inquiries of the Home Office website in the UK, received further advice from bodies in the UK, 
and visited a hospital in the Ukraine. They had also sought and been given both English and 
Ukrainian legal advice. No-one had advised them that they might be unable to re-enter the UK 
with the children because they lacked legal parentage. For errors relating to lost earnings and 
reasonable expenses, see Re S (Parental Order) [2009] EWHC 2977 (Fam) (9 November 2009); 
Re C [2002] 1 FLR 909; C and C [1997] Fam Law 226. Re G (Surrogacy: Foreign Domicile) 
[2007] EWHC 2814 (Fam) (28 November 2007) involved a mistake as to the domicile require-
ment for parentage orders. In Re L (A Child) (Surrogacy: Parental Order) [2010] EWHC 3146 
(Fam) (8 December 2010), [8] (Hedley J) it is noted that the parents received mistaken advice 
that they were ineligible for surrogacy within the UK on the basis of age. 
135  See, eg, a report of incorrect legal advice where intended parents in the ACT were told that they 
did not require a parentage transfer as they were both genetic parents: Carol Nader ‘Bearing the 
ultimate gift’ The Age, 8 May 2010. In state law it is is abundantly clear that male genetic par-
ents in surrogacy are not legal parents if conception was achieved other than through sex. While 
there was some ambiguity about this status in the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) prior to 2008, the 
issue has since been clarified by legislative amendment through ss 60HA and HB. See Re Mi-
chael: Surrogacy Arrangements (2009) 41 Fam LR 694, discussed in Millbank, ‘De Facto 
Relationships, Same-Sex and Surrogate Parents, above n 40, 191–2.  
136  Birth certificates are only a form of proof; they grant a rebuttable presumption of parentage. If 
the child is conceived through ART, the circumstances of conception generate an irrebuttable 
presumption in law that renders the birth certificate erroneous. 
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listed on an overseas-issued birth certificate ensures that Australian law will 
automatically recognise them as legal parents.137 None of the above is correct, 
yet intended parents continue to list themselves on, and present, birth documenta-
tion based on such mistaken beliefs. 
Assuming that there will be some degree of mistaken non-compliance, it is 
important to note that while some legislative requirements can be waived by 
courts in exceptional circumstances, most cannot. For example, requirements that 
conception take place within the jurisdiction in the ACT and SA, and that 
agreements be made prior to conception in all jurisdictions — and approved by a 
government body in WA — cannot be waived by a court. In many instances, even 
if the court was convinced that the intended parents had acted in good faith and 
made an honest mistake in circumstances where it was clearly in the child’s best 
interests to grant a parentage transfer, such an order cannot be granted.  
Moreover, the dizzying degree of jurisdictional variation concerning which 
requirements can be waived by the court provides more possibility for confusion. 
So, for example, in Queensland the requirement that the birth mother be aged 
over 25 can be waived in exceptional circumstances in order to grant a parentage 
order, if this is in the child’s best interests.138 However, this requirement cannot 
be waived in NSW or WA, nor in Victoria if licensed ART was not used.139 
Requirements that the birth mother obtain counselling and legal advice may be 
waived by the court in NSW, Queensland, Tasmania and WA if the parentage 
order is nonetheless in a child’s best interests,140 but in WA this power of waiver 
is only available if the birth mother is not a genetic parent and at least one of the 
intended parents is.141 Similarly, while courts in NSW, Queensland, Tasmania, 
Victoria and WA are able to grant parentage in exceptional circumstances after 
the child has reached the age of six months,142 those in SA and the ACT have no 
such discretionary power.143  
 
137  It does not. As in the UK, the laws of parentage in the parent’s jurisdiction of residence (not the 
child’s birth) prevail. See, eg, Re Mark (2004) 31 Fam LR 162, 165 (Brown J). 
138  Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 23(2). 
139  In Victoria there is a ‘dual track’, so that the requirements differ depending on whether licensed 
ART is used. It is a requirement of both the ART and parentage legislation that the birth mother 
is over 25, but the ART legislation provides for a Patient Review Panel which can authorise non-
compliant arrangements in exceptional circumstances. Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 
2008 (Vic) ss 40(1)(b), 41; Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) s 23(2).  
140  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) ss 18(2), 22(1); Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 23(2); Surrogacy Bill 
2011 (Tas) cl 14(3)(a); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) ss 21(3)(a), (b). 
141  Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 21(3),(4). 
142  Surrogacy Act 2010 (NSW) s 16(3); Surrogacy Act 2010 (Qld) s 23(2); Surrogacy Bill 2011 
(Tas) cl 13(2); Status of Children Act 1974 (Vic) s 20(3); Surrogacy Act 2008 (WA) s 20(3). 
143  In addition, South Australian transitional provisions providing eligibility for parentage transfer 
for existing children were originally limited to those under the age of five at the time the legisla-
tion came into operation: Statutes Amendment (Surrogacy) Act 2009 (SA) sch 1 cl 1(4). This 
meant that the child of one of the chief campaigners for the law — who was then aged five years 
and two months — was excluded: Liz Walsh ‘Heartache for Mum — Surrogacy Law Blow’, 
Sunday Mail (Adelaide), 16 May 2010, 25. Fortunately, this was remedied by the Statutes 
Amendment (Surrogacy) Amendment Act 2010 (SA), which extends the age of the child to 10. 
Note, however, that this amendment still withholds discretion from the court. 
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Even if parties do know exactly what is required of them in order to take part in 
a recognised surrogacy arrangement, they may still be unable to comply. For 
instance, an intended mother who does not have viable eggs, or a gay male 
couple, residing in a jurisdiction that requires gestational surrogacy, must be able 
to find both a birth mother and an egg donor to help them. Recalling that it is 
prohibited to advertise for a birth mother or use any form of professional 
intermediary to locate one, intended parents are effectively casting around their 
family and friends for someone who is both willing and able to fit the narrow 
criteria required by law. The vision of second wave surrogacy as a relationship 
between family and friends may not be realistic for many. Of the 69 reported 
arrangements in the media survey, 15 involved a birth mother who was related to 
one of the intended parents, and in a further 12 the birth mother was a friend. Yet 
the majority of reported arrangements, 36, involved a birth mother who was 
previously unknown to the intended parents.144 
While prerequisites for the birth mother may be very hard to comply with, 
there are also requirements of the intended parents that will simply be impossible 
for some to meet, such as those concerning marital status and sexual orientation 
in SA and WA. Although the majority of intended parents in the media survey 
identified themselves as married heterosexual couples,145 there was a sizable 
proportion who were not, including 16 gay male couples and two single peo-
ple.146 The first parentage application under the Queensland regime was success-
fully brought by a gay male couple.147 
When the surrogacy reforms were being debated in WA, the Attorney-General 
stated that between 40 and 50 couples were awaiting surrogacy in that State, and 
he estimated that around 25 women per year would apply.148 In fact it was nearly 
two years after the passage of the reforms before the first application was 
received by the approval body,149 and at the time of writing the total number of 
 
144  In addition there were six arrangements where the previous relationship of the parties was 
unclear. Of the arrangements involving the relatives, 11 were related to the intended mother and 
four to the intended father. Most relatives were sisters, although there was also two mothers and 
one aunt (both of the intended mother) and two cousins. 
145  Forty three of the arrangements involved heterosexual couples: 38 of whom were married at the 
time of the report (including one couple who had been unmarried at the time of the surrogacy), 
one couple in a de facto relationship, with a further four couples whether the relationship status 
was not clear.  
146  There were also eight female intended parents who did not identify their relationship status. 
147  BLH v SJW [2010] QDC 439 (28 September 2010). Because the arrangement had been made 
prior to the commencement of the Act, the case involved the operation of transition provisions 
allowing for waiver of numerous procedural requirements.  
148  Yasmine Phillips and Debbie Guest, ‘Surrogacy Laws Bring Hope after Long Wait’, The West 
Australian (Perth), 27 June 2008, 11. After the passage of the legislation, the Health Minister 
gave lower estimates, stating that he expected 10 couples to undertake surrogacy applications in 
the first year the process was offered, with five to eight applications in subsequent years: Yas-
mine Phillips ‘Laws Make Surrogacy “Close to Impossible”’, The West Australian (Perth), 31 
March 2009, 14. 
149  Natasha Boddy, ‘WA Gets First Surrogate Mother Bid’, The West Australian (Perth), 7 August 
2010, 15. 
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applications stood at three.150 All of the parties quoted in the media survey after 
the 2007 Western Australian Bill was tabled indicated their inability to comply 
with its requirements. Desiree and Stephen Case, intended parents who had been 
involved in the process of campaigning for the laws, reported that they were 
unable to find a birth mother over the age of 25.151 In two further reports, 
intended parents indicated that they were unable to find a birth mother at all and 
were speaking to the press in the hope that someone would come forward.152 
Others noted that the time and expense involved in the Western Australian 
process were so onerous that they planned to, or already had, travelled out of the 
jurisdiction instead. In the words of Alisa Latto, an intended parent:  
Basically, the new [WA] laws, for me, still make it close to impossible to do 
surrogacy. … There are still so many hoops that you’re required to jump 
through and it’s such a time-consuming and expensive process.153 
Time is of the essence, particularly for intended mothers who want to use their 
own eggs, and the lengthy assessment and approval process has been cited as a 
significant barrier. Ms Latto planned to undertake paid surrogacy in the US at a 
cost of approximately $100 000 because, in her view, it would be comparable in 
price and ‘easier in the long run’.154 Lisa Morgan stated that she was ‘fed up’ 
with the ‘drawn-out process’ and excessive cost of psychological assessment and 
government approval in WA — estimated at $15 000 — and, as such, was 
considering interstate travel.155 Another woman, who had spent years pursuing 
surrogacy options and ultimately travelled overseas, was reported as saying of the 
Western Australian provisions: ‘I’m not afraid of red tape but when you come 
across about 25 brick walls, you’ve just got to say to yourself “it’s time to change 
tack”’.156 
So what happens when intended parents ‘change tack’? It is striking that in the 
overwhelming consensus to be ‘cautious’ and implement extensive ‘safeguards’ 
around ‘altruistic’ surrogacy,157 none of the state inquiries directly addressed the 
problem of parentage for children when adults travel out of the jurisdiction 
and/or pay a birth mother to carry the pregnancy.  
 
150  By November 2010 two applications had been approved and a further one was under considera-
tion: Jacobsen, above n 112. 
151  Phillips and Guest, above n 148, 11. 
152  Peta Rule, ‘Support, But No Surrogacy For Kylie’, The West Australian (Perth), 22 January 
2007, 13; Anthony Deceglie, ‘Who Will Have Our Baby’, The Sunday Times (Perth), 11 April 
2010, 16. 
153  Phillips, above n 148, 14. 
154  Ibid 
155 Anthony Deceglie, ‘25yo Limit Stalls Births’, The Sunday Times (Perth), 20 June 2010, 40. 
156  Quoted in Natasha Boddy, ‘WA Gets First Surrogate Mother Bid’, The West Australian (Perth), 7 
August 2010, 15. 
157  See, eg, the following statement by the VLRC: ‘altruistic surrogacy … should be regulated with 
great care … [and] careful scrutiny. Safeguards are necessary to protect surrogates, commission-
ing parents and children’: VLRC Report, above n 4, 168. 
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VI  TRAVEL AND PAYMENT  
There is significant evidence that the past response of many Australians pre-
vented from undertaking ART by eligibility restrictions in the laws of their home 
state has been to travel elsewhere.158 Indeed, second wave inquiries included 
detailed testimony from intended parents and fertility clinics that cross-border 
travel for surrogacy was a common response to both direct and indirect prohibi-
tions on surrogacy in the home state.159 Parliamentary debates and second wave 
reports are peppered with references to parents being ‘forced’ to travel as a result 
of first wave legislation.160 Some reports, such as that issued by the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission, openly acknowledged multiple adverse consequences 
of earlier restrictions on ART and surrogacy: 
The inability of people to seek treatment in their home state has serious impli-
cations. First, it puts the commissioning parent(s) and the surrogate to unneces-
sary inconvenience. Second, it means that the legal relationships between the 
parties involved are uncertain. …The uncertainty surrounding the legal status of 
a child born of a surrogacy arrangement interstate may mean that parties do not 
disclose the nature of the conception upon their return to Victoria.161  
I would also add that there are very serious harms for those who are unable to 
travel — for example if they cannot afford to do so — as they may be excluded 
from their preferred, or only available, family formation avenue.  
It is noteworthy that of the 69 reported surrogacy arrangements in the media 
survey, travel to evade restrictive local laws or access donor gametes unavailable 
in the home jurisdiction occurred in 44 arrangements.162 Travel to another 
Australian state was reported in nine arrangements, while international travel was 
reported in 35 cases.163 Yet there has been very little consideration of the issue of 
travel, or residence, in crafting the parentage transfer regimes.  
 
158  See, eg, Kerry Petersen et al, ‘Assisted Reproductive Technologies: Professional and Legal 
Restrictions in Australian Clinics’ (2005) 12 Journal of Law and Medicine 373, 383, where the 
authors detail how fertility services in Victoria responded to legislative restrictions on access to 
ART by actively facilitating treatment elsewhere. In 2008 the Canberra Fertility Centre reported 
that it had accepted 35 Queensland couples for IVF surrogacy: Queensland Report, above n 4, 
11. 
159  Second wave inquiries received submissions specifically detailing interstate travel for ART in 
relation to surrogacy: see, eg, South Australian Report, above n 4, 26–7; Queensland Report, 
above n 4, 11. This included clinics in SA providing pre-conception services, for example blood 
tests, to enable embryo transfers which took place across the border. 
160  Indeed Philip Ruddock, the former federal Attorney-General (who had previously been involved 
in federal government attempts to prevent unmarried women from having the right to access to 
ART), argued for national laws on surrogacy in 2006 with the claim that ‘it is not satisfactory 
that people are forced to effectively forum-shop … This can be distressing for people who have 
already faced difficulties starting a family’: quoted in VLRC Report, above n 4, 166 (emphasis 
added). 
161  VLRC Report, above n 4, 171. 
162  In addition, in nine current arrangements, although travel was not reported as part of the 
arrangement in place, the intended parents indicated that they would travel to evade local law if 
necessary. 
163  In addition, there was one arrangement where the birth mother was currently living overseas but 
it was unclear who would travel where. 
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The belatedly-issued 2009 SCAG proposal for legislative harmonisation did 
refer in passing to evasive travel, which it termed ‘forum shopping’. Despite its 
guiding principle of minimal intervention, the paper proposed limiting intended 
parents to the most restrictive common denominator: 
Acknowledging that there may be some lack of uniformity in relation to various 
preconditions for a parentage order (for example in relation to the eligibility of 
same-sex parents, or the nature of screening undertaken) it is considered appro-
priate to specify a connection between the intended parents and the State or Ter-
ritory in which the application is made, to prevent exploitation of these differ-
ences (forum shopping). … 
A requirement to reside in the State or Territory will deny access to a parentage 
order to couples who forum shop if there are discrepancies in eligibility and 
preconditions between the jurisdictions.164  
It is extraordinary that the putative victim in the above passage is the law itself 
rather than the infertile people excluded by its discriminatory operation. Here 
intended parents are construed as powerful consumers (or ‘shoppers’) who 
exploit legal variation through domestic travel. The SCAG paper went on to 
present a series of options regarding how (but not if) to limit parentage transfer 
within each jurisdiction.165  
International travel by Australian intended parents for surrogacy may have 
increased in the years immediately preceding the commencement of most of the 
reforms. The parent support group ‘Australian Families Through Gestational 
Surrogacy’ surveyed overseas IVF clinics and agencies known to engage in 
surrogacy and asked them to report on surrogate births to Australian intended 
parents. The figures returned by these providers showed a three-fold increase in 
births in a three year period, from 97 in 2008–9 to 269 in 2010–11.166  
While travel and payment raise distinct legal and policy issues, undertaking 
surrogacy overseas does appear to render payment significantly more likely. It is 
for this reason that I discuss the issues of international travel and payment 
together. The media survey demonstrated a very strong correlation between 
international travel and ‘commercial’ payment: of the 35 international arrange-
ments it is striking that 32 parties reported payment to the birth mother.167 In 
contrast, none of the parties who travelled within Australia reported payment. 
Twenty international arrangements involved the intended parents travelling to 
the US, with 12 families travelling to India. There were three arrangements where 
it was unclear whether the intended parents or the birth mother had travelled,  
 
164  SCAG Paper, above n 5, 14. 
165  Ibid 14–15. 
166 Australian Families Through Gestational Surrogacy,  ‘Statistics on Babies Born to Australians’ 
(2011) <http://www.surrogacyaustralia.org/australian-babies-born-by-clinic/statistics-on-babies-
born-to-australians>. 
167  The exceptions were a past arrangement, with a sister living in the US who acted as birth 
mother, and two current arrangements between gay male couples and birth mothers in New 
Zealand in which it was not clear whether payment was involved.  
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involving two birth mothers from New Zealand and one from Borneo. While 
most of the reported international arrangements involved travel to the ‘first 
world’ — particularly the US, mostly California — it also appears that travel to 
less developed countries is on the increase. This trend is evinced by the develop-
ment of support groups for intended parents engaging in commercial surrogacy in 
India168 and the issuing of official guidance on the practice by the Australian 
High Commission in New Delhi.169 In addition, cases are now appearing in the 
Family Court where surrogacy was undertaken in Thailand.170  
International surrogacy intermediaries are usually commercial entities, often 
ART providers or matching agencies acting in conjunction with them. Moreover, 
domestic Australian prohibitions on payment for surrogacy, gamete donation, and 
advertising or acting as an intermediary for surrogacy mean that travel may be 
undertaken precisely because it provides broader opportunities for surrogacy 
through payment. In the words of one intending mother, Kylie Gair, who was 
prepared to spend $200 000 on international surrogacy: 
Commercial surrogacy would make my situation a lot easier, because currently 
if you don’t already know someone who can be your surrogate, it’s very hard to 
find someone in Australia. … A lot of people thought I was mad, but when I 
asked them if someone offered them $200,000 now on the condition that they 
never had a child, would they take it, they understood.171 
Among the reported ‘commercial’ international arrangements, the total costs 
quoted ranged from a low of $30 000 to a high of $300 000, with an average of 
$50 000 in India and $150 000 in the US.172 When the amount of payment to the 
birth mother was specified, it usually comprised around 10 per cent of the total 
cost in India and around 20 per cent in the US. Based on these media reports it 
 
168 See, eg, Tigerlilycat, ‘Australia India Surrogacy Advocates’ on Tigerlilycat, Made in India (26 
January 2009) <http://152am.blogspot.com/2009/01/australia-india-surrogacy-advocates.html>; 
Amani (Meg), ‘Australian Families Through Gestational Surrogacy’ on Amani (Meg), Amani 
and Bob’s Indian Surrogacy (13 March 2011) <http://amaniandbobsurrogacy.blogspot.com/ 
2011/03/this-is-community-service-announcement.html>; ‘Surrogacy — India’ discussion 
thread, Essential Baby <http://www.essentialbaby.com.au/forums/lofiversion/index.php/ 
t654643.html>. Note also Australian Families Through Gestational Surrogacy, above n 166: of 
269 surrogate births to Australian intended parents in 2010–11, 179 were from clinics and agen-
cies in India, 45 from Thailand, 36 from the US and 9 from Canada. This may reflect the self-
selection of facilities contacted for the survey. Respondents comprised 7 clinics and agencies 
from India, 1 clinic from Thailand, 6 agencies from the US and 1 agency from Canada.  
169  Australian High Commission (India), Children Born through Surrogacy Arrangements Applying 
for Australian Citizenship By Descent <http://www.india.embassy.gov.au/ 
ndli/vm_surrogacy.html>.  
170  Collins and Tangtoi [2010] FamCA 878 (9 August 2010); O’Connor and Kasemsarn [2010] 
FamCA 987 (29 October 2010); Dennis and Pradchaphet [2011] FamCA 123 (22 February 
2011). These cases are discussed below in Part VIII (‘The Consequences of the Australian Ap-
proach for Legal Parentage and Australian Citizenship’). 
171  Quoted in Rule, above n 152, 13. 
172  Note also that of the reported ‘altruistic’ domestic arrangements where no payment was made to 
the surrogate, intended parents indicated that they incurred costs which ranged from $30 000 to 
$90 000. While the bulk of such payments were for private fertility treatment (because public 
funding is not granted to IVF treatment for surrogacy in Australia), they also included legal 
expenses of between $20 000 and $50 000. See, eg, Norman, above n 46; Joel Gibson, ‘Com-
plex Surrogacy Laws to be Untangled’, Sydney Morning Herald, 8 May 2010, 15. 
   
M.U.L.R. — Millbank — printed 21/06/2011 at 12:07 PM — page 30 of 44
  
30 Melbourne University Law Review  [Vol 35 
 
     
appears that birth mothers in India are being paid less than those in the US in 
both relative and real terms. 
Issues of payment and their relation to informed consent are complex and 
justify considered policy inquiry, which they simply have not had in Australia to 
date. Anita Stuhmcke has argued that criminal prohibitions on paid surrogacy 
within Australia have never been adequately explored or justified.173 Others have 
suggested that the distinction between ‘commercial’ and ‘altruistic’ surrogacy is 
confusing and untenable174 and that ‘payment’ is not an effective proxy for 
‘exploitation’,175 which can and should be addressed in other ways.176 These 
debates are explored at length elsewhere.177 Widespread concern that interna-
tional surrogacy may involve harmful practices178 has unfortunately not been 
accompanied by detailed empirical research. Because the second wave inquiries 
were explicitly limited to ‘altruistic’ surrogacy, none of them considered what 
role, if any, payment played in terms of informed consent or power imbalance; 
nor did they receive any evidence as to whether and how such risks were exacer-
bated in the international context. 
While the SCAG discussion paper touched on international commercial surro-
gacy in passing, it assumed rather than demonstrated harm: 
A concern has been raised that there may also be a need to introduce a resi-
dency requirement for the surrogate mother, in part to prevent the exploitation 
 
173  Anita Stuhmcke, ‘The Criminal Act of Commercial Surrogacy in Australia: A Call for Review’ 
(2011) 18 Journal of Law and Medicine 601. 
174  An argument made as long ago as 1990 in the NBCC Report, above n 18, [2.4.4.4-9]. There is a 
lack of clarity around, for example, what ‘reasonable expenses’ entail and whether they can 
include wage and risk based forms of compensation. As one intended mother stated in the media 
survey, ‘I would never expect someone to carry a baby for me and not be compensated for pain 
and suffering. People still die in childbirth’: Bruce McDougall, ‘Pay Surrogate Mums’, Daily 
Telegraph, 2 August 2008. 
175  See, eg, Stephen Wilkinson, ‘The Exploitation Argument against Commercial Surrogacy’ (2003) 
17 Bioethics 169, 184–7; Eric Blyth and Claire Potter, ‘Paying for it? Surrogacy, Market Forces 
and Assisted Conception’ in Rachel Cook et al (eds), Surrogate Motherhood: International 
Perspectives (2003) 227, 232–3. See also the argument of Anne Jequier, an IVF doctor quoted in 
the media survey: 
Everyone gets their knickers so much in a twist about commercial surrogacy, but … I believe 
that money is perhaps one of the healthiest motivators you can have for doing most things. 
One of the things that we are starting to see is some really unpleasant pressure being put on 
close friends and relatives to act as surrogates because commercial surrogacy is banned. 
  Quoted in Denise Rice, ‘Surrogacy a Legal Maze’, The Sunday Times (Perth), 17 June 2007, 68. 
176  See, eg, Jennifer Damelio and Kelly Sorensen, ‘Enhancing Autonomy in Paid Surrogacy’ (2008) 
22 Bioethics 269, 275–7; Wilkinson, above n 175, 168. 
177  See, eg, Jason K M Hanna, ‘Revisiting Child-Based Objections to Commercial Surrogacy’ 
(2010) 24 Bioethics 341. 
178  See, eg, Jennifer A Parks, ‘Care Ethics and the Global Practice of Commercial Surrogacy’ (2010) 
24 Bioethics 333; Damien W Riggs and Clemence Due, ‘Gay Men, Race Privilege and Surro-
gacy in India’ (2010) 22 Outskirts <http://www.chloe.uwa.edu.au/outskirts>; Jennifer Rimm, 
‘Booming Baby Business: Regulating Commercial Surrogacy in India’ (2009) 30 University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 1429; Ruby L Lee, ‘New Trends in Global Out-
sourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation’ (2009) 20 Hastings Women’s Law 
Journal 275; Amrita Pande, ‘Commercial Surrogacy in India: Manufacturing a Perfect Mother-
Worker’ (2010) 35 Signs 969. 
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of women in third-world countries, given that this seems to be a developing 
practice in some places.179 
In fact, as discussed earlier, while all the state parentage regimes ultimately 
included residency of the intended parents and half also addressed place of 
conception, none looked to the residency of the birth mother. However, NSW 
introduced extraterritorial criminalisation of paid surrogacy through an eleventh-
hour amendment by government Member of Parliament Linda Burney after the 
Bill had already passed through the Legislative Council. Ms Burney stated that 
she was especially concerned about ‘women in poor or developing countries’, 
arguing that 
[b]y making commercial surrogacy an extraterritorial offence we will help to 
prevent exporting this exploitation of women overseas. We do not support it 
here so why should we support it overseas? 
In some countries where commercial surrogacy is allowed, such as the United 
States, some regulation is in place to protect the wellbeing of surrogate moth-
ers. In other countries regulation is mostly absent. In my mind it would be irre-
sponsible and indeed immoral to legislate in New South Wales but to be silent 
on the potential exploitation by our own citizens of vulnerable women overseas 
…180 
Using payment an absolute proxy for ‘exploitation’ has meant there has been 
no identification of what these risks are and their occurrence or likelihood; nor 
consideration of what role Australian law could play in trying to ensure that the 
risk of harm elsewhere is minimised. 
The assumption that the imposition of criminal penalties will prevent the prac-
tice is also plainly ill-founded. In addition to considerable evidence of past 
evasion presented at the various surrogacy inquiries, several parties who featured 
in media reports were from jurisdictions where their conduct was criminal at the 
time,181 and some applications for parenting orders in the Family Court involve 
parties whose conduct may have been unlawful in their home state.182 Indeed the 
 
179  SCAG Paper, above n 5, 14. 
180 New South Wales, Parliamentary Debates, Legislative Assembly, 10 November 2010, 27599 
(Linda Burney). 
181  For example, a Queensland couple, ‘Dee’ and ‘Rob’ undertook paid surrogacy in the US were 
able to conceal the circumstances of the birth because they had recently moved house: Kay 
Dibben, ‘Surrogacy’s Problem Child’, The Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 22 June 2008, 62. Another 
Queensland couple, Dana and Ben Deverson, undertook paid surrogacy in the US (even though 
Dana was a former police officer). When Dana then conceived naturally, she found it ‘hard to 
explain’ how her children are seven months apart in age: Kay Dibben, ‘Mystery Woman Brought 
Us Joy’, The Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 18 January 2009, 17; Ainsley Pavey, ‘Naturally, A Miracle 
For Couple “Unable to Conceive”’, The Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 22 April 2007, 39. 
182  The only contested surrogacy arrangement to go before the courts in Australia to date involved 
intended parents who resided in Queensland (and an agreement which was made in Queen-
sland): Re Evelyn (1998) 23 Fam LR 53. The case was heard before the Family Court in 1997, 
and then the Full Court of the Family Court on appeal in 1998 in Brisbane. None of the parties 
to the arrangement were charged with an offence under Queensland law. See also Collins and 
Tangtoi [2010] FamCA 878 (9 August 2010); Dennis and Pradchaphet [2011] FamCA 123 (22 
February 2011), both cases concerning paid surrogacy in Thailand with intended parents who 
reside in Queensland.  
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first parentage order in Queensland concerned an arrangement which was 
criminal when it was entered into.183 Even with the relaxation of ART laws for 
surrogacy in SA, Victoria and WA, it appears likely that evasive travel for 
surrogacy will continue. Indeed, seven parties in ‘current’ arrangements in the 
media survey reported that they planned to or had engaged in travel, and six of 
these parties specifically noted that this was due to the restrictive nature of the 
new long-awaited laws in their home state.184 
I acknowledge that surrogacy overseas may pose a greater risk of harm to 
participants than surrogacy within Australia, for reasons that include ART 
treatment occurring within health settings that are less than optimal. One example 
is the use of multiple embryo transfer in IVF. Multiple transfer is an inherently 
risky practice because it increases the likelihood of multiple pregnancy and birth, 
with considerably higher health risks to both the birth mother and babies, 
including neonatal death, cerebral palsy and pre-eclampsia.185  
While the media survey is an imperfect source of data, it does suggest that the 
practice of multiple transfer is more common in international surrogacy arrange-
ments than domestic ones. Of the 42 past arrangements reported in the media 
survey, eight resulted in multiple births, including seven sets of twins and one of 
triplets. Only one of those multiple births occurred following ART within 
Australia: four occurred following ART in India, and three following ART in the 
US. Recollecting that overseas arrangements accounted for just over half of the 
total pool — whether or not the media pool itself is representative of broader 
experience — the incidence of multiple births is clearly disproportionately high. 
A further three reports indicated implantation of multiple embryos in overseas 
arrangements, one of which was a current arrangement in India where it was 
planned that four embryos would be transferred in the first treatment cycle.186 In 
addition, of the six decisions concerning international surrogacy that have thus 
far been released by the Family Court, it is notable that four families had 
twins.187 
 
183 BLH v SJW [2010] QDC 439 (28 September 2010). 
184  See text at above nn 153–156; Kay Dibben, ‘I’ll Carry Your Child — Couples Wait for New 
Law’, The Sunday Mail (Brisbane), 25 January 2009, 28; Larry Schwartz, ‘Dads Double Their 
Brood’, The Age (Melbourne), 24 January 2008, 15; Tamara McLean, ‘Gays Flock to US For 
Babies’, Herald Sun (Melbourne), 2 July 2008, 4. 
185  See, eg, the evidence detailed in the report used as the basis for the UK changes: Peter Braude, 
One Child at a Time: Reducing Multiple Births after IVF — Report of the Expert Group on 
Multiple Births after IVF (October 2006) Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/MBSET_report.pdf>. The report begins, at 3:  
Multiple pregnancy is a major cause of stillbirth, neonatal death and disability. Compared 
with singletons, twins are four times more likely to die in pregnancy, seven times more likely 
to die shortly after birth, ten times more likely to be admitted to a neonatal special care unit, 
and have six times the risk of cerebral palsy. Maternal morbidity and mortality is also in-
creased due to late miscarriage, high blood pressure, pre-eclampsia, and haemorrhage amongst 
others. 
186  Annette Sharp, ‘Charmyne’s Indian baby’, The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 9 November 2010, 
16.  
187  Wilkie and Mirkja [2010] FamCA 667 (9 July 2010); Collins and Tangtoi [2010] FamCA 878 (9 
August 2010); O’Connor and Kasemsarn [2010] FamCA 987 (29 October 2010); Dennis and 
Pradchaphet [2011] FamCA 123 (22 February 2011). In this last case there were in fact three 
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The implantation of multiple embryos has been prohibited or strongly discour-
aged by ethics committees and regulators in countries such as Australia and the 
UK in recent years.188 Within Australia, the national code requires ART clinics to 
‘continuously attempt to reduce the incidence of multiple pregnancies’189 and 
specifically requires that no more than two embryos be transferred in any woman 
aged under 40.190 In the context of surrogacy, multiple transfer is particularly 
troubling. Multiple transfer places the interests of ART providers above those of 
the birth mother and potential child(ren). In the first place, IVF is taking place 
with women whose fertility is not in doubt, and for whom the likelihood of a 
multiple birth is particularly high. Multiple implantation increases the likelihood 
of a pregnancy, and in doing so it hastens the process, cuts costs to parents and 
boosts the ‘success’ rates of clinics. However, the risks from these successes fall 
squarely on the birth mother and the child(ren) of multiple births (and also, 
arguably, upon intended parents if a child dies or is born disabled or with acute 
health needs).191 In my view these risks are likely to be exacerbated in any 
context in which enforceable surrogacy contracts and/or pre-birth parentage 
transfer is sanctioned by law. This is because the birth mother may lack, or 
believe she lacks, the power to manage the pregnancy through, for example, 
selective termination, on the basis that the foetuses are not legally ‘hers’.192 
My argument is therefore not that international surrogacy is without risk of 
harm. Rather, it is that extraterritorial criminal sanctions in the ACT, NSW and 
Queensland, and the categorical exclusion of children born through paid surro-
gacy from legal parentage regimes throughout all Australian jurisdictions, 
represent an insufficiently justified and most likely ineffective response. In my 
view, these provisions will not prevent Australians from engaging in paid 
surrogacy overseas, nor do anything to render that practice less risky for any of 
those involved. Indeed, criminalisation may inhibit constructive discussion about 
 
children born to the intended parents through two simultaneous arrangements, one child to Ms 
Pradchaphet and twins to another woman, Ms C. The proceedings relating to the twins were 
listed separately. Rusken and Jenner [2009] FamCA 282 (13 March 2009) involved parties who 
were resident in South Africa at the time IVF for surrogacy was undertaken there; more than one 
embryo was implanted, which resulted in the birth of one child. In contrast, of the four decisions 
released concerning domestic arrangements, none involved a multiple birth. 
188  See, eg, policy changes made in the UK by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Agency 
from 2005 onwards after an expert review of the risks: for an outline of these changes, see 
<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/530.html>. 
189  Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee, Fertility Council Australia, Code of 
Practice for Assisted Reproductive Technology Units (2008, revised October 2010) 11 
<http://www.fertilitysociety.com.au/wp-content/uploads/201011201-final-rtac-cop.pdf>. 
190  Ibid. In addition, the Code requires providers to recommend to patients that only one embryo be 
transferred in a first treatment cycle of a woman under 35. 
191  Surrogacy overseas also appears more likely to involve egg donors whose identities are not 
recorded and who are therefore untraceable, in contrast to the Australian approach, which in-
creasingly favours the provision of an opportunity for identification of the donor if the child 
wishes this upon reaching adulthood. 
192  The Assisted Reproductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010 (India) cl 34(23) provides that 
‘a surrogate shall be duty-bound not to engage in any act that would harm the foetus during 
pregnancy’. At the time of writing the Bill was still in draft form and had not been tabled in 
Parliament. 
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how domestic surrogacy could be expanded or international surrogacy made 
safer.  
Recall that almost half of the 69 surrogacy families reported in the media 
survey are ineligible for any form of parentage transfer within Australia — even 
if jurisdictional restrictions were removed — because they were ‘commercial’ 
and not ‘altruistic’ arrangements. The media survey suggests that when parents 
are able to return to Australia without revealing that the child was in fact born 
through surrogacy, they are often doing so. So, for instance, where intended 
parents who are heterosexual couples are both listed on the birth certificate by the 
foreign jurisdiction, they may simply apply for citizenship by descent and return 
to Australia as if they were the birth parents. This is an undesirable outcome for 
many reasons, including that intended parents may feel obliged to continue to 
conceal this information not just from the state but from health care providers, 
their social circles and perhaps the child themselves.  
International surrogacy adds a number of challenges to the already complex 
issue of legal parentage and, as a consequence, citizenship. Courts in both France 
and Germany have recently denied citizenship to the genetic children of their 
nationals born overseas through surrogacy.193 As discussed, Australia has 
followed the UK approach by introducing post-birth parentage transfer regimes. 
These require that parent(s) and child are within the jurisdiction in order to 
apply,194 adding a catch 22 dimension to international surrogacy — one must 
return from overseas in order to utilise the parentage transfer process, but may 
find it hard to bring a child into the country without first establishing legal 
parentage. The contrast between the Australian approach and the UK response to 
this conundrum is instructive.  
 
VII   THE UK  APPROACH  
In the UK, although at least one of the intended parents must be domiciled in 
the UK to be eligible for parentage transfer, conception can take place elsewhere. 
In addition, the approach to payment is broader and more flexible than that in 
Australia. Payments for reasonable expenses can include amounts based on an 
estimate of lost wages for the birth mother. Furthermore, even when reasonable 
expenses have been exceeded, UK courts have held that they can retrospectively 
authorise earlier payments to a birth mother in order to grant parentage if it is 
clearly in the child’s best interests to do so. This approach means that it is 
possible for discretionary permission to be granted to children born overseas 
 
193 See Nisha Satkunarajah ‘Legal Case Brings France’s Surrogacy Laws into Focus’ (18 April 
2011) 604 BioNews; Nisha Satkunarajah, ‘Surrogate Child Denied German Passport’ (9 May 
2011) 606 BioNews. 
194 See Re K (Minors: Foreign Surrogacy) [2010] EWHC 1180 (Fam) (28 May 2010) [6] 
(Hedley J). See also UK Border Agency, Inter-Country Surrogacy and the Immigration Rules (1 
June 2009) <http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/residency/Intercountry-
surrogacy-leaflet>. 
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through paid surrogacy to enter the UK so they can then regularise their status. 
Under 2010 regulations, once a parentage order is made in the UK, citizenship is 
automatically conferred on the child.195 
The 2008 English case of X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) (‘X and Y’)196 illus-
trates this approach. An English couple travelled to the Ukraine to engage in 
surrogacy using the intended father’s sperm and a donor egg. The Ukrainian birth 
mother gave birth to twins who were registered according to Ukrainian law as the 
children of the English intended parents. Yet under UK law the birth mother and 
her partner remained the legal parents unless and until the transfer process 
occurred in the UK. Thus the twins were not entitled to enter the UK as they did 
not – as yet – have English parents; thus they faced the prospect of being stateless 
orphans. The Home Office gave the twins discretionary permission to enter the 
UK in order to access the parental orders available under s 30 of the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK), orders which would now be 
available under s 54 of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008 (UK). 
However, the Court was faced with the obstacle that there had been payment 
beyond reasonable expenses to the birth mother. 
The intended parents paid a total of €27 000 to the birth mother, structured as a 
wage while she was pregnant and a large balance paid in two lump sums post-
birth, when the Ukrainian and then UK paperwork for parentage was consented 
to.197 Frankly, there could be no clearer breach of the UK payment provisions, 
which specify that payment (other than for expenses reasonably incurred) must 
not be made in connection with consent to parentage orders.198 In light of the 
above discussion on mistaken non-compliance, it is noteworthy that the intended 
parents had received both English and Ukrainian legal advice, as well as advice 
from a surrogacy support organisation, yet were unaware of the critical facts that 
the twins would lack UK citizenship and that the payments they made would be 
in breach of UK law. 
Hedley J used a three step test, based on factors considered in earlier cases on 
surrogacy and adoption,199 to consider whether the Court should retrospectively 
authorise the payment. These steps were: 
1 was the sum paid so disproportionate to reasonable expenses it would 
offend public policy?  
2 were the applicants acting in good faith and without ‘moral taint’ in their 
dealings with the surrogate mother? 
3 were the applicants party to any attempt to defraud the authorities?200  
 
195 Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Orders) Regulations 2010 (UK). 
196  [2008] EWHC (Fam) 3030 (9 December 2008). 
197  Of the €25 000 lump sum, 80% was payable on the surrogate mother’s provision of a consent for 
the applicants to be registered on the Ukrainian birth certificate, and the balance on the signing 
of written consent to the UK parental order application: ibid [17] (Hedley J). 
198 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 30(7). 
199  See C and C [1997] Fam Law 226 (25 June 1996); Re C [2002] 1 FLR 909. 
200 X and Y [2008] EWHC 3030 (9 December 2008) [21]–[22]. 
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The second and third questions were answered unhesitatingly in the applicants’ 
favour. In considering the first question, whether the value of the payment was so 
excessive as to offend against public policy, the Court suggested that the ‘answer 
may vary considerably depending upon where the arrangement was made. The 
whole basis of assessment will be quite different in say urban California to rural 
India.’201 Ultimately, the Court determined that the payment was not excessive by 
reference to the comparable cost of living in urban Ukraine and the UK.202  
In coming to the decision to retrospectively authorise the payment, the Court 
noted that it was torn between two competing and irreconcilable concepts — 
Parliament’s clear intention to prevent commercial surrogacy at the level of 
general policy versus the court’s duty to mitigate such policy by consideration of 
the child’s welfare in the individual instance: 
The difficulty is that it is almost impossible to imagine a set of circumstances in 
which by the time the case comes to court, the welfare of any child (particularly 
a foreign child) would not be gravely compromised (at the very least) by a re-
fusal to make an order.203  
In this and other cases involving payment in excess of reasonable expenses, the 
English courts have consistently fallen on the side of individual children’s 
welfare in granting parentage orders. In a later case, Hedley J considered 
amendments which raised the welfare of the child to be the paramount considera-
tion and held that this tipped the balance between public policy and welfare 
‘decisively in favour of welfare’, such that ‘it will only be in the clearest cases of 
the abuse of public policy that the court will be able to withhold an order if 
otherwise welfare considerations support its making.’204 
The Australian parentage transfer regimes do not enable judges to exercise any 
discretion in similar cases. This raises the question: what is happening to children 
in such cases?  
VIII   THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE AUSTRALIAN APPROACH FOR 
LEGAL PARENTAGE AND AUSTRALIAN C ITIZENSHIP  
Children born overseas through ART in surrogacy arrangements are not the 
legal children of their Australian intended parent(s) under state and territory law 
or under the FLA, regardless of genetic link and regardless of any provision in a 
foreign birth certificate or court order to the contrary. The question of whether 
 
201  Ibid [22]. 
202  This line of reasoning suggests that payment for surrogacy in rural India must be lower than 
payment in urban Ukraine in order to be acceptable to public policy. I think it is worth reflecting 
upon a principle which requires poor people in poor countries to be paid less in order to prevent 
exploitation. 
203  X and Y [2008] EWHC 3030 (9 December 2008) [24] (Hedley J). 
204  Re L [2010] EWCH 3146 (Fam) (8 December 2010) [10]. 
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children born through surrogacy are entitled to enter Australia by virtue of 
Australian citizenship by descent is therefore complex and uncertain.205 
The Australian Citizenship Act 2007 (Cth) s 8 (‘Citizenship Act’) defines a 
parent through assisted conception or surrogacy by reference to the definitions 
contained in ss 60H and 60HB of the FLA. As discussed earlier, s 60H provides 
that the birth mother (and consenting partner) are legal parents regardless of 
genetic link if conception is undertaken through assisted means, and also 
prescribes the various parentage laws to the same effect.206 Section 60HB 
accords intended parents legal status via state surrogacy parentage regimes 
prescribed by regulation.207 In short, citizenship law reflects family law, which in 
turn reflects the state parentage laws including the surrogacy transfer regimes — 
but state-based surrogacy transfers cannot be accessed prior to entering Australia, 
and, moreover, they exclude arrangements in which payment has been made to 
the birth mother.  
Perhaps because of the above conundrum, the Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship (‘DIAC’) issued instructions in 2009 which declared that the defini-
tion of a parent in surrogacy under s 8 of the Citizenship Act ‘does not apply to 
surrogacy arrangements entered into overseas’,208 with two more sets of instruc-
tions issued in 2010 continuing to proceed on the basis that the s 8 definition only 
 
205  In the absence of a legal connection to either intended parent, intended parents could be in 
breach of the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry 
Adoption (‘Hague Convention’) if they attempt to remove the child from the country of birth to 
be adopted in Australia without complying with the requirements for inter-country adoption: see 
Hague Convention, opened for signature 29 May 1993, 1870 UNTS 167 (entered into force 1 
May 1995) ch 2. New Zealand has issued advice that, where a child is born as a result of over-
seas surrogacy in a Hague Convention signatory, an inter-country adoption is the only way to 
create a legal parental relationship with the child: Department of Internal Affairs, Child, Youth 
and Family and Immigration New Zealand, International Surrogacy <http://www.cyf.govt.nz/ 
documents/adoption/international-surrogacy-information-sheet.pdf>. The Australian Citizenship 
Instructions also note this result of the Hague Convention: Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship, Australian Citizenship Instructions (July 2009) 31 <http://www.citizenship.gov.au/ 
__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/213560/aci-jul-2009.pdf>. However, it is far from clear that the 
Hague Convention is applicable if the child is already the child of the intended parents under the 
law of the sending country and no adoption will be attempted in the receiving country. Article 2 
provides that (emphasis added): 
(1) The Convention shall apply where a child habitually resident in one Contracting State 
(‘the State of origin’) has been, is being, or is to be moved to another Contracting State 
(‘the receiving State’) either after his or her adoption in the State of origin by spouses 
or a person habitually resident in the receiving State, or for the purposes of such an 
adoption in the receiving State or in the State of origin.  
(2) The Convention covers only adoptions which create a permanent parent–child rela-
tionship. 
206  See also FLA s 60HA; Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth) regs 12C, 12 CA. 
207  See Family Law Regulations 1984 (Cth) Reg 12 CAA. 
208  Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Citizenship Instructions (ACIs) (July 
2009) 31 <http://www.citizenship.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/213560/aci-jul-2009.pdf>. 
The Instructions continue: ‘Section 8 of the Act applies to couples who use artificial conception 
procedures or surrogacy arrangements occurring under a prescribed law of an Australian state or 
territory to become parents to a child.’ 
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applies to domestic surrogacy despite there being no wording in the Citizenship 
Act to indicate this.209  
In the absence of s 8, it appears that the approach of DIAC is to apply an 
interpretation of the ‘ordinary meaning’ of ‘parent’ to grant citizenship by descent 
under s 16(2) of the Citizenship Act.210 It appears that citizenship is being granted 
if at least one of the intended parents is able to prove genetic parenthood through 
DNA testing and this is accompanied by evidence of the legality of parentage for 
at least one of the intended parents and relinquishment of parental rights by the 
birth mother in the foreign jurisdiction.211 This suggests that the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ that is being applied encompasses a combination of genetic parentage 
and deference to the laws of foreign jurisdictions which transfer parentage prior 
to birth or which accord male genetic parents legal status at birth despite concep-
tion having taken place through assisted means. While intuitively the ‘ordinary’ 
meaning of parent may seem inclusive, it does not allow for consistent applica-
tion, as, for example, it extends to a male genetic parent but provides no answer 
for a female genetic parent. Deference to foreign laws of parentage is extremely 
problematic. Arguably there is no basis for this deference in Australian laws of 
parentage212 and the result is an incoherent approach in policy and further 
uncertainty and inconsistency in practice.  
Instructions on surrogacy issued by the Australian High Commission in India 
repeatedly reference ‘contractual’ arrangements granting parentage, including 
 
209  Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Citizenship Instructions (ACIs) (May 
2010) 49 <http://www.citizenship.gov.au/_pdf/acis-may-2010.pdf>. The Instructions provide: 
‘Some circumstances are not covered by section 8. These include children born to single women 
as a result of artificial conception procedures, and children who are born overseas as a result of a 
surrogacy arrangement.’ In the Instructions issued in September 2010, this text is omitted and 
s 8 is only addressed under the heading ‘Children born in Australia as a result of a surrogacy 
arrangement’, and then under the following heading, ‘Children born overseas as a result of a 
surrogacy arrangement’: Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Citizenship 
Instructions (ACIs) (September 2010) 49, 50 <http://www.citizenship.gov.au/_pdf/acis-sept-
2010.pdf>. The instructions direct parents to contact the Citizenship Help Desk: at 50. 
210  See H v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 272 ALR 605, 612 (Moore, Kenny 
and Tracey JJ). 
211  Department of Immigration and Citizenship, Australian Citizenship Instructions (ACIs) (July 
2009) 31 <http://www.citizenship.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/213560/aci-jul-
2009.pdf>: 
A surrogate child will generally be eligible for Australian citizenship by descent if at least one 
of the biological parents is an Australian citizen, who has been granted full parental rights by a 
court of law. In the case of a child born as a result of surrogacy arrangements, it is a require-
ment for registration of citizenship by descent that there be a genetic link between a parent 
and the child in question and that that parent be recognised on the birth certificate.  
Documents required to register a surrogate child as an Australian citizen by descent are: a 
statement from the doctor to the courts stating clearly that genetic material from person A 
and/or person B has been implanted in person C; and court documentation stating clearly the 
legal custody of the surrogate child and waiving the rights of the surrogate mother. The state-
ment must also confirm the doctor’s statement regarding the person/s donating the genetic ma-
terial.  
Family situation is not relevant to registration of citizenship by descent, provided at least one 
biological parent is an Australian citizen who has been granted full parental rights by a court 
of law.  
  See also Australian High Commission (India), above n 169. 
212  Re Mark (2004) 31 Fam LR 162, 173–4 (Brown J). 
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consideration of their enforceability.213 Using an enforceable contract for 
surrogacy as the basis to accord Australian citizenship is anathema to all surro-
gacy laws throughout Australia as well as to general Australian law on parent-
age.214 To be clear: the ability to compel the birth mother to relinquish the child 
under foreign law is a factor being taken in favour of granting recognition of 
parentage through Australian citizenship. Thus it appears that executive action is 
according recognition to the very practice most emphatically rejected by law 
within Australia — a commercial, contractual approach to surrogacy, including 
transfer of parentage as an enforceable obligation which can take place against 
the wishes of the birth mother. 
 I do not object to the fact that authorities are trying to prevent children born 
through international commercial surrogacy arrangements from being rendered 
stateless orphans. However, the situation outlined above is surely a perverse 
outcome in terms of the policy objectives guiding the Australian approach. The 
legal parentage of such children should be remedied by a more direct, transparent 
and inclusive legislative response. 
Moreover, deference to the foreign laws of parentage has led to inequitable and 
unpredictable outcomes. Children born to Australian parents through surrogacy in 
countries that do not provide for the relinquishment of parental rights by the birth 
mother through either court orders or contract have been denied citizenship by 
descent. In three cases concerning surrogacy undertaken in Thailand, the Austra-
lian Embassy in Bangkok denied applications on this basis, meaning that the 
parents were stranded overseas for between three and nine months and ultimately 
 
213  Australian High Commission (India), above n 169. Under the section headed ‘Written advice 
confirming legal parentage’, the website advice states: 
Where a client is unable to obtain court documentation stating the legal parentage of the child 
… clients will be requested to provide written advice from a lawyer expert in Indian family 
law and/or contract law that their surrogacy contract is legal and confirming they are the legal 
parent(s) of the child.  
This advice should include comment on the general legality of the contract (with reference to 
the provisions of Indian legislation that make it valid) and whether the contract confirms the 
legal parentage of the child (with reference to the relevant provisions of Indian legislation). It 
should also include comment on the following elements and state the grounds on which the 
lawyer is satisfied that these elements are met. 
  whether all parties consent to the contract;  
  whether the contract is legally enforceable;  
  whether the contract gives full legal parental rights to the Australian citizen parent;  
whether the contract waives the parental or any other rights of any other parties to the con-
tract; and  
whether the contract includes evidence that all parties are still consenting and still agree to 
the contract after the birth of the child concerned.  
  This situation will be further complicated if India passes proposed ART legislation, which 
requires foreign nationals engaged in surrogacy in India to present documentation that any 
resulting child would be entitled to enter the intended parents’ home country: Assisted Repro-
ductive Technologies (Regulation) Bill 2010 (India) cl 34(19). At the time of writing (January 
2011), the Bill was still in draft form and had not been tabled in Parliament.  
214  See, eg, ND and BM (2003) 31 Fam LR 22, [23]–[27] (Kay J): one cannot contract out of 
parental status, even if all parties are in agreement. See also Re Evelyn (1998) 23 Fam LR 53, 
where the terms of the surrogacy agreement were irrelevant to the court’s inquiry about who 
should raise the child.  
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were only able to bring the children to Australia having obtained Thai passports 
and travel visas for them.215 Once within Australia the parties applied to the 
Family Court for parenting orders, which do not offer parental status per se but 
can remove the parental responsibility of the birth mother and grant parental 
responsibility to the intended parents. In turn the Australian Embassy indicated 
that it would accept such orders as the basis for citizenship by descent after the 
child was on-shore.216 This is a situation of considerable uncertainty.217 
The examples of India and Thailand detailed above reveal a significant slip-
page, even hypocrisy, of Australian law and policy in its approach to parental 
rights for children born through international commercial surrogacy. In effect, the 
federal government is treating the children as citizens for limited purposes, using 
changing and non-transparent procedures, yet categorically denying intended 
parents access to the very state-based transfer regimes which would actually 
transfer legal parentage.  
The default position of relying upon Family Court orders to provide some 
parental relationship in law is also very unsatisfactory for other reasons. As 
discussed, parental responsibility orders do not offer all of the protections to 
children which legal parentage does. In addition, such orders are being made in 
wider circumstances and in accordance with more lax processes than those 
required by the parentage transfer regimes. The Family Court must apply a 
general ‘child’s best interests’ test developed in the context of separating parents, 
without any consideration of the specific factors which direct the role of the state 
courts in parentage transfer. So while the Family Court must consider the benefit 
to the child of a relationship with the legal/birth mother,218 it is not obliged to 
inquire into, or be satisfied of, the informed consent of the birth mother; nor is it 
required to undertake any consideration of the role of payment, or the amount 
paid, in assessing whether the agreement was conscionable.  
 
215  Collins and Tangtoi [2010] FamCA 878 (9 August 2010) [9]–[10] (Loughnan J); O’Connor and 
Kasemsarn [2010] FamCA 987 (29 October 2010) [12]–[15] (Ainslie-Wallace J); Dennis and 
Pradchaphet [2011] FamCA 123 (22 February 2011) [6]–[8] (Stevenson J). 
216  Collins and Tangtoi [2010] FamCA 878 (9 August 2010) [10] (Loughnan J). This appears to be 
an incorrect reading of s 16(2) of the Citizenship Act, which the Full Federal Court has recently 
stated requires that the parent be a parent at the time of the child’s birth: see H v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship (2010) 292 ALR 605, 638 (Moore, Kenny and Tracey JJ). Al-
though Family Court orders do suffice to make a person a ‘responsible parent’ under s 6(1)(c) of 
the Citizenship Act (and a responsible parent is required to submit the application for a child 
under s 16(2)), the Full Federal Court in H also held that the definition of parent s 6(1)(c) does 
not determine who is a parent for the purposes of s 16(2): at 621 (Moore, Kenny and Tracey JJ). 
217 In mid 2011 the Australian Embassy in Bangkok published information on its website describing 
the requirements for citizenship by descent in surrogacy as ‘under review’ (3.1) and providing 
instructions on the processing of applications for travel visas for children born through surro-
gacy: <http://www.thailand.embassy.gov.au/bkok/DIAC_Children_surrogacy.html> The Em-
bassy instructions mirror the Australian High Commission in New Dehli in requiring DNA 
testing to establish a genetic link with at least one Australian parenta but also require a manda-
tory interview with the birth mother and her husband (if any) to ascertain her consent to the 
child’s removal from Thailand: [6.6]. 
218  Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 60CC. The court must apply a presumption of equal parental 
responsibility to the legal parents: at s 61DA. 
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Since 2003, there have been six decisions released by the Family Court con-
cerning applications for parental responsibility for children born through paid 
international surrogacy. The first three cases concerned intended parents who 
were gay male couples, all from Victoria: Re Mark involved a child born from a 
surrogacy arrangement in California,219 Cadet and Scribe (‘Cadet’) concerned a 
child from an arrangement in Ohio,220 and Wilkie and Mirkja (‘Wilkie’) con-
cerned twins born in India.221 Collins and Tangtoi (‘Collins’),222 Dennis and 
Pradchaphet (‘Dennis’)223 and O’Connor and Kasemsarn (‘O’Connor’)224 all 
concerned children born in Thailand, to two couples from Queensland and a 
single man from NSW, respectively. While each judgment records that the 
intended fathers’ sperm was used (including, in the case of the male couples, 
which father’s sperm was used), and that a donor egg was used in the conception 
in all instances,225 not one records the amount of money paid to the birth mother 
or the identity of the egg donor. Only the judgment in Re Mark includes any 
detail of the terms of the surrogacy arrangement.226 Again it is of concern that 
extraterritorial provisions criminalising paid surrogacy are likely to prevent 
parties from revealing such information, and may also inhibit the court from 
inquiring into such matters for fear that it will expose parents to prosecution. 
In Re Mark the birth mother was served with notice of the proceedings and 
elected not to participate,227 while in Cadet, Collins, O’Connor and Dennis the 
birth mother was served with notice and consented to the orders as a party to 
proceedings (although in none of these cases did she attend the hearing).228 Thus 
the courts received some evidence, albeit limited, of the birth mothers’ consent to 
the arrangements. In Collins, O’Connor and Dennis the birth mother gave 
evidence by affidavit which included the information that she had received legal 
advice and that an interpreter had read her all of the relevant documents, includ-
ing the affidavits and applications for orders.229 In Collins the Court concluded 
that although ‘[t]here are always concerns in relation to a case where one of the 
 
219 (2004) 31 Fam LR 162. 
220  [2007] FamCA 1498 (5 November 2007). 
221  [2010] FamCA 667 (9 July 2010). 
222  [2010] FamCA 878 (9 August 2010). 
223 [2011] FamCA 123 (22 February 2011).  
224  [2010] FamCA 987 (29 October 2010). 
225 Ibid [3] (Ainslie-Wallace J); Re Mark (2004) 31 Fam LR 162, 163 (Brown J); Cadet [2007] 
FamCA 1498 (5 November 2007) [2] (Brown J); Wilkie [2010] FamCA 667 (9 July 2010) [6] 
(Cronin J); Collins [2010] FamCA 878 (9 August 2010) [2] (Loughnan J); Dennis [2011] 
FamCA 123 (22 February 2011) [5] (Stevenson J). 
226 (2004) 31 Fam LR 162, 163 (Brown J). 
227 Ibid. Brown J also noted that the birth mother ‘was not a respondent to the initiating application 
and did not seek to be joined or heard in respect of that proposed application’: at 176. 
228 Cadet [2007] FamCA 1498 (5 November 2007) [1] (Brown J); Collins [2010] FamCA 878 (9 
August 2010) [1] (Loughnan J); O’Connor [2010] FamCA 987 (29 October 2010) [9] (Ainslie-
Wallace J). 
229 Collins [2010] FamCA 878 (9 August 2010) [5]–[6] (Loughnan J); O’Connor [2010] FamCA 
987 (29 October 2010) [8]–[9] (Ainslie-Wallace J); Dennis [2011] FamCA 123 (22 February 
2011) [14] (Stevenson J). 
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parties is outside the jurisdiction and does not speak English’,230 any such 
concerns were here assuaged by the affidavit evidence of the birth mother and 
interpreter, as well as by the evidence of a Thai lawyer.231 
The 2010 case of Wilkie is far more troubling. The judgment notes that the 
surrogacy arrangement was overseen by a solicitor in Mumbai who was subse-
quently unable to contact the birth mother because she had given a false address. 
The intended parents had not met the birth mother and so could not provide any 
further information.232 In this case the court did not require any further attempt to 
locate the birth mother, dispensed with the requirement of service of the proceed-
ings on the birth mother,233 and granted the orders with no further inquiry into her 
role. Again I stress that I do not cavil at an outcome which provides security for 
children through parental responsibility for the parents raising them. Rather, I 
argue that the state based regimes — if they included commercial and out-of-
jurisdiction surrogacy — would provide a far more focused and thoroughgoing 
inquiry into the consent of all parties and the fairness of the arrangement. 
The ‘cautious’ approach to regulation embodied in the new Australian surro-
gacy laws is unduly complex and inflexible. If the use of commercial interna-
tional surrogacy continues, there will ultimately be a far weaker level of protec-
tion for the rights of birth mothers and the interests of children than if the 
domestic regimes had been more liberal in their coverage. 
IX  CONCLUSION  
Several rounds of inquiry and the implementation of ‘liberalising’ reforms to 
Australian surrogacy laws may offer limited practical benefit to surrogacy 
families. Restrictive ART laws, including exhaustive and expensive mandatory 
state assessment and approval processes in Victoria and WA, and variable and 
restrictive parentage transfer regimes, combined with a lack of judicial discretion, 
mean that many — perhaps most — surrogacy families will be excluded. An 
inconsistent and opaque policy on Australian citizenship for children born 
overseas adds a further layer of confusion. 
To return to the basic principles of surrogacy laws throughout Australia: they 
aim to prevent the exploitation of women who act as birth mothers, prevent the 
commercialisation of reproduction, and protect the interests of current and future 
children born through these means. None of these principles is absolute, and as 
Hedley J suggested in X and Y, sometimes they must be balanced against each 
other.234 
 
230 [2010] FamCA 878 (9 August 2010) [20] (Loughnan J). 
231 Ibid [20]–[21]. 
232 Wilkie [2010] FamCA 667 (9 July 2010) [2] (Cronin J). 
233 I infer from the following passage an assumption that the birth mother is illiterate:‘There are no 
indications as to her status or intellectual capacity which would enable me to find that a notice 
by way of advertisement in a newspaper would bring the application to her attention’: ibid [2] 
(Cronin J). 
234  X and Y [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam) (9 December 2008) [24] (Hedley J). 
   
M.U.L.R. — Millbank — printed 21/06/2011 at 12:07 PM — page 43 of 44
  
2011] The New Surrogacy Parentage Laws in Australia 43 
 
     
Surrogacy is not a field in which clear legal solutions offering an appropriate 
balance of principle and pragmatism are readily apparent. Nonetheless, this 
article argues that the Australian approach is a manifest failure. A simple first step 
towards improvement would be to amend the parentage transfer regimes to bring 
them more closely into line with the English approach, allowing applications if 
there is conception outside the jurisdiction and granting broader discretion to 
deal with non-compliance, including instances in which payment has been made 
to the birth mother. In terms of substantive eligibility, discriminatory require-
ments, such as those concerning marital status and sexual orientation, ought to be 
removed in the states which have them, as they prevent the court from being able 
to consider the individual child’s best interests. Marital status requirements are 
also inconsistent with the modern approach to Australian family and relationship 
laws, which largely includes same-sex couples and parents on an equal footing 
with heterosexual families and enables a case-by-case assessment of parental 
capacity where necessary.235 
If Australian policymakers are genuinely concerned about outsourcing surro-
gacy arrangements overseas, it would be worth them reconsidering some of the 
fundamental tenets of domestic surrogacy law and policy. First wave bans on 
advertising for surrogacy and acting as an intermediary in surrogacy were widely 
framed and have not been reconsidered in the second wave reforms. Most of 
these prohibitions are not limited to paid surrogacy, making it very difficult, if 
not impossible, for intended parents to engage in unpaid surrogacy domestically 
if they do not have a pre-existing relationship with the birth mother. Moreover, 
second wave reforms introduced crude legislative proxies for power imbalance 
and informed consent — such as rules requiring the birth mother to be over 25 or 
have given birth to her own child — which appear to be impeding domestic 
arrangements further. Given that many of the parentage transfer regimes, as well 
as the current practice of fertility providers, stress the use of extensive counsel-
ling processes, such proxies could be relaxed in favour of specific inquiry into 
the actual motivations and state of mind of the birth mother concerned. As with 
other recommendations in this article, this change would involve increased 
discretionary power for the court in parentage transfer applications. 
For the longer term, I suggest that the question of a wage-based or risk-based 
compensation approach to payment for birth mothers involved in domestic 
surrogacy should be properly addressed. In addition, the extension of public 
health funding for fertility treatments to cover their use in surrogacy arrange-
ments would help to make surrogacy more affordable within Australia, and 
thereby reduce incentives for international travel. 
While the prospect of a third wave of reforms may appear premature (and 
exhausting!), all of the above changes would permit a more accessible and 
realistic framework by which surrogacy can take place within Australia. Keeping 
 
235  Millbank, ‘De Facto Relationships, Same-Sex and Surrogate Parents’, above n 40, 183–93. 
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surrogacy onshore would in turn provide a far greater opportunity for harm 
minimisation objectives to be pursued through legal avenues. 
